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Compulsion Over Comity: The United
States' Assault on Foreign Bank Secrecy
C. Todd Jones*
"Upon fundamental principles of international comity, our courts
dedicated to the enforcement of our laws should not take such action as
may cause a violation of the laws of a friendly neighbor or, at least, an
unnecessary circumvention of its procedures." 1 Circuit Judge Leonard
Moore's statement in 1960 in one of the first U.S. bank secrecy cases
evidences a respect for foreign nations and tribunals no longer present.
Because of their physical proximities and tory secrecy laws, many na-
tions have become bank secrecy havens, providing financial services and
anonymity to people and business enterprises, both legitimate and illegiti-
mate. In response, U.S. courts have systematically circumvented almost
any challenge to the authority of our prosecutors and judicial procedures
presented by nations that respect and uphold financial privacy. Unfortu-
nately, efforts by other branches of the United States government to ease
the friction created by the courts have proved to be only moderately ef-
fective and remain essentially unrecognized by the judiciary.
This paper first discusses the history and evolution of bank secrecy
and blocking laws, providing a background on the original rationale be-
hind the customs and the values underlying them. Second, it examines
the foreign laws and financial structures used to protect the right to fi-
nancial privacy. Next, the U.S. evidence gathering techniques, particu-
larly those used by the government, and the bilateral and multilateral
legal assistance efforts of the executive branch are explored; this section
will also note the minimal constitutional barriers to evidence procure-
* Assistant Counsel, National Association of Rehabilitation Facilities, Washington, D.C.; J.D.,
B.S.B.A., University of Denver. The author wishes to thank J. Robert Brown and Deborah Bayles
for their comments and suggestions.
1 Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1960) [hereinafter Ings].
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ment that restrain the government. The article then considers the Re-
statement of Foreign Policy positions on balancing competing interests
and the precedents of the U.S. judiciary used to solve conflicts outside
international agreements. Finally, trends in U.S. judicial and executive
branch policy are analyzed and the critical problems with those policies
dissected.
I. HISTORICAL BANK SECRECY
While banking, money changing, and finance are as old as civiliza-
tion, the practice of bank secrecy developed in recent centuries. Modern
bank secrecy evolved after World War I when hyperinflation and ex-
change controls forced prudent individuals to hold assets outside of their
home nations.2 Other nations attempted to control their economies with
restrictive monetary practices which enhanced the appeal of other more
stable and friendly economic environments. The first major international
conflict challenging the new bank secrecy order occurred during this
post-war economic upheaval. In 1933, the Nazis published regulations
requiring all German nationals to declare assets held outside of Ger-
many. The penalty for noncompliance was the death sentence. 3 The exe-
cution of three Germans one year later prompted the Swiss government
to codify what until then had been only an unofficial secrecy practice
among Swiss bankers. The new law provided for strong criminal penal-
ties for violations.4
The first international counter-attack against the Swiss law, how-
ever, came not from Germany but from the United States. When the
Germans invaded Poland, the Swiss kept their bank assets in U.S. finan-
cial institutions. After the fall of France, the Swiss, fearing an invasion,
physically moved their national gold supply to New York. In mid-1941,
U.S. government officials became convinced that Nazis were hiding their
wealth in Swiss deposit accounts. Based on the personal jurisdiction over
the Swiss branches located in the United States, the government at-
tempted to obtain account holder names from the branches, only to dis-
cover that the holdings were in the names of the banks and not the
clients. In response, the U.S. government blocked the expatriation of all
2 See E. CHAMBOST, BANK AccouNTs 5 (1983).
3 Id. at n.f. Their modest statute declared, "Any German national who, deliberately or other-
wise, activated by a base selfishness or any other vile motive, has amassed his wealth abroad or left
capital outside the country, shall be punished by death." Id.
4 Id. at 6. See also STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, CRIME AND
SECRECY, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., THE USE OF OFFSHORE BANKS AND COMPANIES 5-6 (Comm. Print
1983) [hereinafter STAFF REPORT].
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Swiss assets and gold reserves. 5 This plenary use of personal jurisdiction
over both persons and property would later be repeated to obtain the
secret bank information the United States desired.6
After World War II, the reasons for bank secrecy expanded. Cur-
rency and other government economic controls remained after the war
while the expansion of socialism and, concomitantly, heavy income taxes
drove money to secrecy havens.7 Criminal tax statutes, a new
prosecutorial weapon, increased investors' desires for secret locales to
hide assets from government investigation. The growth of international
crime also facilitated the growth of banking centers that protected bank
customers' identities and assets. Many small nations, given this currency
ffight and their own lack of hard currency, catered to such customers
with favorable bank secrecy laws.8
5 E. CHAMBOST, supra note 2, at 6-7.
6 See; eg., In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494, 495 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom, 484 U.S. 963
(1987) [hereinafter Sealed Case]; In re Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 463
U.S. 1215 (1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404, 405 (5th Cir.),
cert denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976) [hereinafter Field]; see also infra notes 248-56, 283-86 and accom-
panying text.
7 Cf United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1983) [hereinaf-
ter First Chicago]. These laws merely respond to the forces of the market:
The limits of banking secrecy only conform to the needs of the marketplace if they resist abuses
and remain as diligent as they are expected to be. These expectations would be thrown over if
banking secrecy was raised to help the legal authorities in other countries in the event that their
exchange controls had been violated; the prohibition on exporting currency goes against those
needs. Consequently banking secrecy must guarantee complete protection to currency and as-
sets deposited and must observe the obligation to be diligent, even if that does not suit the
financial rulings of other countries.
E. CHAMBOSr, supra note 2, at 20-21 (citations omitted).
8 Typical is the view of Donald M. Fleming, President of a Bahamian bank, former Canadian
Minister of Finance, and former President of the International Monetary Fund: "The secrecy at-
tached to relations and transactions between financial institutions and their clients has been another
factor essential in the attraction of financial business.. ." (quoted in E. CHAMBOST, supra note 2, at
196).
Hard currency needs are not limited to economic backwater islands and communist nations.
Many of the Pacific Rim's newly industrialized countries attract capital with bank secrecy practices.
Hong Kong and Singapore were both identified as secrecy havens, particularly for tax purposes, in
STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 10-11. Switzerland, the classic secrecy jurisdiction, could hardly be
classified as a non-democratic backwater. IL
A number of jurisdictions are cited by the STAFF REPORT as secrecy or tax havens. They
include Anguilla, Antigua, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Bahrain, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin
Islands, Canada, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, Falkland
Islands, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guam, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Ireland, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lux-
embourg, Maldives, Mariana Islands, Mexico, Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru, Netherlands and
Netherlands Antilles, Nevis, New Hebrides (Vanatu), Panama, Seychelles, Singapore, St. Lucia, St.
Kitts, St Vincent, Switzerland, and Turks and Caicos Islands. Id.
Such mass lists, however, are deceiving and incomplete because of the evolving nature of se-
crecy jurisdiction laws, politics, and the true practical value of particular nations. For example in
the Americas, many nations are classified as havens but only five-Bermuda, Bahamas, Cayman
Islands, Netherlands Antilles, and Panama-have developed into viable and successful havens. R.
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The United States has taken a completely opposite view of the prac-
tice, viewing foreign bank secrecy as a mechanism to facilitate and pro-
mote illegal activity. As reported from the House Committee on
Banking and Currency twenty-two years ago:
Secret foreign bank accounts and secret foreign financial institutions have
permitted a proliferation of "white collar" crimes; have served as the finan-
cial underpinning of organized criminal operation in the United States;
have been utilized by Americans to evade income taxes, conceal assets Hile-
gally and purchase gold; have allowed Americans and others to avoid the
law and regulations governing securities and exchanges; have served as es-
sential ingredients in frauds including schemes to defraud the United States;
have served as the ultimate depository of black market proceeds from Viet-
nam; have served as a source of questionable financing for stock acquisi-
tions, mergers and takeovers; have covered conspiracy to steal from the
U.S. defense and foreign aid funds; and have served as the cleansing agent
for 'hot' or illegally obtained monies.... The debilitating effects of the use
of these secret institutions on Americans and the American economy are
vast. It has been estimated that hundreds of millions in tax revenues have
been lost.9
While the report might have overstated the cause of such activities, it
reflects many of the illegal uses of bank secrecy as well as the federal
government's attitude toward enforcing its laws. Since that time, the
government's passion for enforcing the laws most likely to implicate
bank secrecy (L e., tax, 10 economic regulation, 11 and narcotics laws12) and
JOHNS, TAx HAvENs AND OFFSHORE FINANCE 191 (1983). For a variety of reasons including
foreign legal constraints, disreputable practices, political instability, remoteness, and lack of eco-
nomic development, other nations failed to achieve the success of the former five. Id. at 191-194.
Lists like the STAFF REPoRT's also remain inherently incomplete. Havens such as Guernsey,
Jersey, and the United Arab Emirates were ignored in the STAFF REPORT list. Id. at 214. Other
nations developed their systems later. See Duthie, Malaysia Seeks to Turn Sleepy Island into a Pros-
perous Offshore Tax Haven, Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1990, at B4B, col. 3.
9 H. Rep. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970), reprinted in Field, supra note 6, at 409. This
report's heavy-handed language prompted one commentator to remark, "[S]uch a list of crimes
makes you think rather more of scapegoats than bank secrecy .. " E. CHAMBOST, supra note 2, at
101.
10 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985) [hereinafter Nova Scotia 11]; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United
States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983)
[hereinafter Nova Scotia I]; United States v. Vetco, 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter
Vetco]; Field, supra note 6. See also Springer, An Overview of International Evidence and Asset Gath-
ering in Civil and Criminal Tax Cases, 22 GEO. WAsH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 277, 330 (1988) ("Truly,
the real issue is whether the United States should seriously enforce its tax laws, and not whether
those laws overreach." Author James Springer, Senior Counsel for International Tax Matters, Tax
Division, Department of Justice).
11 "White-collar crime is 'the most serious and all-pervasive crime problem in America today.'
Conyers, Corporate and White-Collar Crime: A View by the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Crime, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 287, 288 (1980), reprinted in Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99,
115 n.9 (1988). "Conduct relating to U.S. import trade that harms consumers in the United States
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blocking statutes13 has not diminished.
An institutionally separate but effectually similar legal device has
arisen since World War II. Blocking laws were designed to prevent per-
sons and enterprises from complying with orders of foreign tribunals and
governments. These laws originated in Canada 14 and have spread
throughout the world as a means of protecting domestic interests from
foreign legal interference.' 5 Nations generally enacted such laws in reac-
tion to countries such as the United States whose aggressive litigation
rules were considered by blocking law jurisdictions to be an infringement
upon their sovereignty. The first Canadian law was created in 1947 due
to a U.S. grand jury investigation of the Canadian paper industry. 6 The
Netherlands enacted a law in reaction to U.S. investigations of the petro-
leum industry.'7 The broadest international response came when the
United States conducted investigations of the international shipping in-
dustry"8 and the world uranium cartel.' 9 The nations in the later cases
viewed U.S. antitrust laws and discovery procedures as a means of pro-
tecting U.S. industry against foreign competition as well as enabling U.S.
may be subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. antitrust laws regardless of where such conduct occurs
or the nationality of the parties involved." US. Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement Guide-
lines for International Operations (Nov. 10, 1988), [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1391, at S-20 (Nov. 17, 1988) [hereinafter DOJ Intl AT Guidelines].
12 A Congressional subcommittee report recommended "aggressively pursu[ing] international
negotiations backed up by the threat of sanctions against banks and countries that do not cooperate"
with U.S. efforts to combat drug money laundering. STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON NARCOTIcs,
TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., DRUG MONEY LAUN-
DERING, BANKS AND FOREIGN POLICY 32 (Comm. Print 1990) [hereinafter BANKS AND FOREIGN
POLICY].
13 See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
14 Ontario, Canada's Business Records Protection Act, 1974 ONT. REv. STAT. c. 54 is credited
as being the first blocking statute. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, § 442 reporters' note 4 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT THIRD].
15 See, e.g., A. LowE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 79-225 (1983) (textual examples of
major secrecy laws, cases arising from secrecy conflicts, and official communications and positions
regarding secrecy laws).
16 In re Grand Jury, Subpoena Duces Tecum Addressed to Canadian International Paper Com-
pany, 73 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (cited in A. LOWE, supra note 15, at xxi-xxii).
17 A. LowE, supra note 15, at xxii, 123.
18 Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and West Ger-
many fashioned blocking laws in response to the investigation. See id. at 98-100, 114-20, 128, 134,
138-43. See also In re Investigations of World Arrangements with Relation to the Production,
Transportation, Refining and Distribution of Petroleum, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952).
19 REsTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 14, at § 442 reporters' note 4. For a list of the statutes in
Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, and South Africa spawned by the controversy, see id.; A.
LOWF, supra note 15, at 129-31 (Philippine Presidential Decree in response to the investigation).
See also In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979) [hereinafter Uranium
Antitrust]; In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977)
[hereinafter Westinghouse]. A later Congressional report recognized this connection between U.S.
government action and foreign government reaction. STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 13-14.
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competitors to gain competitive advantages through litigation. 0
II. FINANCIAL PRIVACY
Financial privacy laws vary by nation;21 the nature and growth of
these laws reflect both the nations themselves and their economic rela-
tionships. The countries vary the practices and design the laws to effec-
tuate the goals sought. While the laws and practices could be divided by
their common and civil law origins, conceptually simpler categories are
the structural banking forms and impediments, the bank secrecy statutes
effectuating those forms, and blocking laws.2
A. Structural Bank Forms and Impediments
Anonymous (also known as numbered) accounts and accounts held
under false names are the two most basic bank secrecy relationships. The
account holder signs an agreement with a personal bank agent agreeing
to the conditions of the relationship and receives a number or pseudo-
nym.23 Pseudonyms are generally used when a client wishes to avoid
raising the suspicion of home government authorities.24
These banking forms create two types of protection. First, they pro-
tect bank employees from third parties. 25 For example, before the Swiss
created numbered accounts, Nazi agents would ask lower level employ-
ees about the accounts of specific individuals. Hesitation by the em-
ployee would give the agent enough evidence to investigate and prosecute
that individual.26 Numbered accounts solve this problem and eliminate
the danger of a third party blackmailing a bank employee for secret in-
formation. Second, secret accounts protect account holders from unscru-
pulous employees. 27 Where a secret account holder's identity might
tempt an unprincipled employee, limited access eliminates the exposure
of such information.
Trust and corporate structures also provide protection for financial
20 STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 13-14. Communist nations used blocking laws to similarly
protect "state secrets." See, e.g., Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902
F.2d 1275, 1280 (7th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter.Administratia Asigurarilor] (Communist Romanian gov-
ernment's secrecy law "appear[ed] to be directed at domestic affairs rather than merely protecting
Romanian corporations from foreign discovery").
21 See E. CHAMBOST, supra note 2, at 12.
22 Id. at 39-67.
23 For several examples of such agreements, see id. at 41-53.
24 Bank correspondence will appear to be between actual persons, creating no suspicion among
law enforcement investigators. Id. at 54.
25 Id. at 40.
26 Id. at 5.
27 Id. at 40.
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information. 28 Trusts are drafted with either an individual or corporate
fiduciary holding assets in their own name for a beneficiary. 29 The trust,
when combined with a confidential account, creates a triple level of se-
curity for investors. A potential investigator must discover the relation-
ships involved, overcome possible legal confidentiality restraints on the
fiduciary,3" and then surmount the particular bank secrecy laws of the
host nation.31
Private offshore banks provide another structural protection for
bank secrecy. These private banks serve individuals or small groups of
investors by creating a personal financial institution. This reduces the
number of individuals with access to information 32 and eliminates the
possible coercion of the parent of a traditional bank's secrecy haven
branch.33 Most private banks, however, are formed because of the finan-
cial advantages in jurisdictions where financial privacy is otherwise the
status quo.34
B. Bank Secrecy Laws
Although secrecy is not always the primary consideration for inves-
tors using the facilities of havens, 35 secrecy remains an important ele-
ment for the international financier's analysis. In financing cases, the
various structural impediments would be meaningless without a legal
28 Swiss law specifically distinguishes between the law regulating banking transactions such as
trust relationships, generally covered by the Swiss Civil Code and Code of Obligations, and public
legislation dealing with banks as institutions. See generally Kleiner, Banking Law, in INTRODUC-
TION TO Swiss LAW (F. Dessemontet & T. Ansay eds. 1981).
29 E. CHAMBOST, supra note 2, at 58-59. See also Salting It Away, The Economist, Oct. 5, 1991,
at 32.
30 The Bahamas includes trusts in its financial secrecy laws while the Cayman Islands includes
an even broader range of professionals in its secrecy laws, including real-estate and insurance agents,
currency dealers, and commercial representatives and advisors whether or not they are licensed or
entitled to act in such a capacity. Id. at 197, 205.
31 For a discussion of a variety of trust relationships, see id. at 58-67.
32 This would also eliminate the entire reason for extensive numbered and anonymous proce-
dures. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
33 See, eg., Nova Scotia I and Nova Scoiia II, supra note 10.
34 Private banks create a captive source of loans for investors, provide additional funds at in-
terbank rates, and eliminate many of the overhead costs of an ordinary bank. However, these advan-
tages can be outweighed by government-imposed fees in those nations. For a discussion of captive
banks, see E. CHAMBOST, supra note 2, at 68-75.
35 Financiers also consider more general and major factors such as infrastructure and telecom-
munications facilities, geographical convenience, local political and economic stability, particular
economic systems, banking and other financial laws, foreign exchange regulations and capital con-
trols, company laws relating to incorporation and disclosure, and government fees in their analysis
as well as a host of lesser, more particular elements. R. JOHNS, supra note 8, at 2-3, 22-23, 42-72,
193. See also W. BLACKMAN, Swiss BANKING IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 48 (1989) ("Bank
secrecy is ... the one most important single ingredient of [customer] confidence.").
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framework to support them. In general, the havens have a legal system
in place that protects the relationship between banker and client or
trustee and client, a concept which the United States rejects.36 Bank se-
crecy statutes exist in a number of nations, but for ease of discussion, the
three affecting U.S. practices the most will be considered in detail.
Switzerland, 7 the Bahamas, 31 and the Cayman Islands39 specifically
protect the banker-client privilege by criminalizing the revelation of in-
formation obtained from such a relationship. Switzerland's law repre-
36 See infra note 60 and accompanying text. Contra Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83
Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961) [hereinafter Peterson].
37 Bundesgesetz iber die Banken und Sparkassen of Nov. 8, 1934 (Banking Law of 1934) [here-
inafter Swiss Bank Secrecy Law], implemented in Verordnung of May 17, 1972 (Ordinance), and
Vollziehungsverordnung of Aug. 30, 1961 (Implementing Ordinance). Article 47 of the 1934 Bank-
ing Law states:
1. Whoever divulges a secret entrusted to him in his capacity as officer, employee, authorized
agent, liquidator or commissioner of a bank, as representative of the Banking Commission,
officer or employee of a recognized auditing company, or who has become aware of such a
secret in this capacity, and whoever tries to induce others to violate professional secrecy, shall
be punished by a prison term not to exceed six months or by a fine not exceeding 50,000 Swiss
francs [approximately U.S. $35,000].
2. If the act has been committed by negligence, the penalty shall be a fine not exceeding 30,000
Swiss francs [approximately U.S. $21,000].
3. The violation of professional secrecy remains punishable even after termination of the offi-
cial employment relationship or the exercise of the profession.
Reprinted in R. KINSMAN, YOUR NEW SWISS BANK BOOK 10 n.2 (revised ed. 1979). See also
Kleiner, supra note 28, at 174 nn. 1, 2.
38 Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act of 1965, 1965 BAH. ACTS No. 64, art. 10, as
amended by Banks and Trust Companies Regulation (Amendment) Act, 1980, 1980 BAH. ACTS No.
3 [hereinafter Bahamian Bank Secrecy Statute], reprinted in Nova Scotia I, supra note 10, at 1386
n.2. Section 10 states:
Preservation of secrecy
10-(1) No person who has acquired information in his capacity as
(a) director, officer, employee or agent of any licensee or former licensee;
(b) counsel and attorney, consultant or auditor of the Central Bank of the Bahamas..., or as
an employee or agent of [the same];
(c) counsel and attorney, consultant, auditor, accountant, receiver or liquidator of any licensee
or former licensee or as an employee or agent of [the same];
(d) auditor of any customer of any licensee or former licensee or as an employee or agent of
such auditor;
(e) the Inspector under the provisions of this Act, shall, without the express or implied consent
of the customer concerned, disclose to any person any such information relating to the identity,
assets, liabilities, transactions, accounts of a customer of a licensee .... except
(i) for the purposes of the performance of his duties or the exercise of his functions under
this Act, if any; or
(ii) for the purpose of performance of his duties within the scope of his employment; or
(iii) when a licensee is lawfully required to make disclosure by any court of competent juris-
diction within The Bahamas, or under the provisions of any law of The Bahamas.
(2) Nothing contained in this section shall
(a) prejudice or derogate from the rights and duties subsisting at common law between a licen-
see and its customer; or
(b) prevent a licensee from providing upon a legitimate business request in the normal course of
business a general credit rating with respect to a customer.
(3) Every person who contravenes the provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall be...
liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding fifteen thousand dollars [U.S.$ 15,000] or
to a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years or to both ....
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sents the codification of a previously informal bankers' practice while the
Bahamian and Cayman laws turned prior judicial precedent into statu-
tory norm.' The Swiss Banking Law of 1934 (Swiss Bank Law) estab-
lished specific duties for bankers, their employees, and government
inspectors. The law criminalized any disclosure of information obtained
in the course of a professional relationship with the bank except as pro-
vided by Swiss law. Absolute secrecy, however, does not exist because
banks must furnish pertinent information when the higher interest of the
public or the state is involved, particularly in cases defined as crimes
under Swiss law.4
The Bahamian Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act (Baha-
mian Statute) requires a laundry list of individuals who have access to
bank records42 in order to maintain confidentiality, except when per-
forming their duties under the Bahamian statute, within the scope of
their employment, or when required by a Bahamian court.43 The Cay-
man Island's government based its Confidential Relationship (Preserva-
tion) Law (Cayman Law) on the Bahamian Statute.' The Cayman Law
dictates that any person required by a court or tribunal to produce infor-
mation held in a protected relationship must apply to a Judge of the
39 Cayman Confidential Relationships Law (Law 16 of 1976), as amended (Law 26 of 1979)
[hereinafter Cayman Bank Secrecy Law], reprinted in United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1032
n.14 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Davis]. In relevant part, the law states:
3. (2) This law has no application to the seeking, divulging, or obtaining, of confidential
information
(a) in compliance with the directions of the Grand Court pursuant to section 3A;
(b) by or to
(i) any professional person acting in the normal course of business or with the consent, ex-
press or implied, of the relevant principal... ;
3A. (1) Whenever a person intends or is required to give in evidence in, or in connection with,
any proceeding being tried, inquired into or determined by any court, tribunal or other author-
ity (whether within or without the Islands) any confidential information within the meaning of
this Law, he shall before so doing apply for directions and any adjournment necessary for that
purpose may be granted.
(2) Application for directions under subsection (1) shall be made to, and be heard and deter-
mined by, a Judge of the Grand Court.
4. (1) Subject to the provisions of [section 3(2)], whoever
(a) being in possession of confidential information however obtained;
(i) divulges it; or
(ii) attempts, offers or threatens to divulge it to any person not entitled to possession thereof;
... is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding $5,000
[U.S. $6024] or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or both.
40 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
41 R. KINSMAN, supra note 37, at 11.
42 Bahamian Bank Secrecy Statute, supra note 38, at § 10(l)(a)-(e).
43 Id. at § 10(l)(e)(i)-(iii).
44 Note, Offshore Financial Centers in Caribbean Basin Secrecy Jurisdictions: Current Trends and
Developments in United States Anti-Tax Haven Policy, 12 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 520, 525-26
n.30 (1986) [hereinafter Offshore Financial Centers].
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Grand Court of the Cayman Islands. 45 In each of these three countries,
as with any nation that seriously implements a bank secrecy law, the
breach of this statutory duty of confidentiality is met with stiff
penalties.'
C. Blocking Laws
Blocking laws "prohibit the disclosure, copying, inspection or re-
moval of documents located in the host country in compliance with or-
ders of foreign authorities,"'47 and are designed to take advantage of the
foreign government compulsion defense.48 There are two categories of
blocking laws. The first prohibits production of documents or testimony
before a foreign tribunal. Some of these statutes provide general protec-
tion of business and commercial documents while others are directed at
protecting specific industries;49 general business practice statutes prevent
the disclosure of all business records, including bank records. Ontario's
Business Records Protection Act of 194750 and Swiss Penal Code section
45 Cayman Bank Secrecy Law, supra note 39. The Cayman Bank Secrecy Law was expanded to
include a broad range of relationships in a 1979 amendment enacted in response to the adverse
decision in the United States. Field, supra note 6.
46 Swiss Bank Secrecy Law, supra note 37, at art. 49(1), (2); Cayman Bank Secrecy Law, supra
note 39, at § 4(a)(ii); Bahamian Bank Secrecy Statute, supra note 38, at § 10(3). Although one
commentator noted the difference in maximum fines in the latter two nations and opined that this
indicated each nation's commitment to its respective laws, the significant prison terms in both are
probably a better indicator of each nation's commitment to the preservation of bank secrecy. Com-
ment, Sidestepping Foreign Bank Secrecy Lawr" No Sanctuary in the Fifth Amendment and Little in
the Interest of Comity, 10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 57, 57 n.1 (1987) [hereinafter Sidestepping Foreign Bank
Secrecy]. In fact, the breadth of relationships covered by the Cayman Bank Secrecy Law might
indicate the contrary. See Cayman Bank Secrecy Law, supra, at § 3(2)(b)(i).
47 STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 13; RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 14, at § 442 reporters'
note 4.
48 RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 14, at § 442 reporters' note 4. The foreign state compul-
sion exception to jurisdiction is that "a state may not require a person to do an act in another state
that is prohibited by the law of that state or by the law of the state of which he is a national." Id. at
§ 441(l)(a).
49 See A. LowE, supra note 15, at xviii.
50 The statute states:
1. No person shall, pursuant to or under or in a manner that would be consistent with compli-
ance with any requirement, order, direction or subpoena of any legislative, administrative or
judicial authority in any jurisdiction outside Ontario, take .... send... or remove ... from a
point in Ontario to a point outside Ontario, any account, balance sheet, profit and loss state-
ment or inventory or any resume or digest thereof or any other record, statement, report, or
material in any way relating to any business carried on in Ontario, unless such taking, sending,
or removal,
a) is consistent with and forms a part of a regular practice of furnishing to a head office or
parent company or organization outside Ontario material relating to a branch or subsidiary
company or organization carrying on business in Ontario;
di is provided for by or under any law of Ontario or of the Parliament of Canada.
2.-(l) Where the Minister of Justice and Attorney General or any person having an interest in a
business as mentioned in section 1 has reason to believe that a requirement, order, direction, or
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27351 exemplify this breed of blocking statute by prohibiting the disclo-
sure of a "manufacturing or business secret" for any purpose.52 A sec-
ond class of blocking statutes prohibits substantive compliance with
foreign government orders.53 Substantive statutes prevent parties from
complying with the orders of foreign government officials.54
Blocking laws usually provide an even stronger defense against for-
eign government action. While bank secrecy laws protect a range of
banking relationships, blocking laws are designed either to protect cer-
tain industries or repel particular discovery techniques. Consequently,
nations are more likely to selectively waive bank secrecy laws in a partic-
ular case than blocking laws.
III. THE UNITED STATES AND FINANCIAL PRIVACY
A. The Common Law
The U.S. treatment of banking relationships differs dramatically
from many foreign nations. Under U.S. common law, the contractual
relationship between banker and client can be sacrificed in only a handful
of situations. Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of Eng-
subpoena as mentioned in section 1 has been or is likely to be made, issued or given in relation
to such business, he may apply to a judge or local judge of the Supreme Court in chambers for
an order requiring any person... to furnish an undertaking and recognizance for the purpose of
ensuring that such person will not contravene section 1 and the judge may make such order as
he considers proper.
(2) Every person who, having received notice of an application under this section, contravenes
this Act shall be deemed to be in contempt of court and is liable to one year's imprisonment.
(3) Every person required to furnish an undertaking or recognizance who contravenes this Act
is in contempt of court and in addition to any penalty provided by the recognizance is liable to
one year's imprisonment.
Reprinted in A. LowE, supra note 15, at 101-02.
Although the statute was enacted in response to a specific grand jury antitrust investigation, the
statute's breadth and future use made it a more general-use blocking statute. Id. at 100.
51 Swiss Penal Code Article 273 states:
Whoever explores a manufacturing or business secret to make it accessible to aforeign authority
or a foreign organization or a foreign private business enterprise, or their agents, whoever
makes a manufacturing or business secret accessible to a foreign authority or foreign organiza-
tion or a foreign private business enterprise or their agents, shall be punished with imprison-
ment, in serious cases with penitentiary confinement. The deprivation of liberty can be
combined with a fine.
Reprinted in A. LOWE, supra note 15, at 136 (emphasis added).
Article 271 forbids Swiss citizens from acting in cooperation with a foreign state without au-
thorization from the Swiss government. Liguori, Yossarian's Nightmare:, A "Catch-22" Between
American Grand Jury Powers and Swiss Nondisclosure Laws-A New Solution, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 229, 232-33 n.14 (1987).
52 Id.
53 A. LOWE, supra note 15, at xviii.
54 See id. at 98-100, 104-05, 123, 138-43, 186-93.
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land (Tournier)" established the common law precedent for determining
when the banker's duty to the client should be superseded. Under
Tournier, a banker owes a client a contractual duty of secrecy except
when: a) disclosures are compelled by law; b) there is a duty to the pub-
lic to disclose; c) the interests of the bank require disclosure; or d) when
disclosure is made with the express or implied consent of the customer.
Courts in the United States follow this interpretation of contractual
duties.
56
United States courts also recognize a variety of other legal bases for
protecting the financial privacy of bank records.57 Agency law has ex-
panded to include the duty of the bank, as agent, to protect information
held for the depositor (L e., the principal).53 State constitutions have been
construed to protect a privacy interest in bank records.59 Previously,
courts found a privacy right under property law theory'o and considered
but rejected a general right of privacy in the bank-client relationship;6 1
however, the continuing validity of the former theory is doubtful.62 Tort
theory has also been noted as possibly providing some protection to an
individual's right to financial privacy.63 But U.S. legal doctrine provides
only the baseline for protecting financial privacy and it can be circum-
vented by government investigators and private parties in the pursuit of
justice. A combination of federal law and federal court interpretations of
investigatory powers have allowed U.S. officials to exploit the first and
fourth exceptions in Tournier for their maximum value.
55 Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of England, [1924] 1 K.B. 461 (C.A.) [here-
inafter Tournier.
56 See Plombeck, Confidentiality and Disclosure. The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and
Banking Secrecy, 22 INT'L LAW. 69 (1988).
57 For a discussion of the conflicting duties of bankers, see Hubs, To Disclose or Not To Disclose
Customer Records, 108 BANING L.J. 30 (1991).
58 Peterson, supra note 36.
59 For a discussion of two leading cases, Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d
590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974), and Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542
P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1975) [hereinafter Valley Bank], see Comment, The Bank Secrecy Act
Privacy, Comity, and the Politics of Contraband, 11 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 667, 682 (1986)
[hereinafter Politics of Contraband].
60 Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 A. 34 (N.J. Ch. 1929). The court quoted In re Pacific Ry.
Comm'n, 32 F. 241 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887) and cited FTC v. American Tobacco, 264 U.S. 298 (1924),
decisions whose continuing validity is doubtful. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186 (1946) [hereinafter Oklahoma Press]; see also infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
61 See, eg., cases rejecting the theory cited in Politics of Contraband, supra note 59, at 683 n.120.
62 See Peterson, supra note 36.
63 "The tort theories of invasion of privacy and defamation, though containing fundamental
deficiencies, may provide some protection of financial privacy." Plombeck, supra note 56, at 69 n.3,
citing L. FIsCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 5.04 (1983).
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B. Federal Records Requirements
In 1970, Congress mandated the collection of banking instruments
by banks under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA).64 Contrary to its noble
name, the BSA's stated purpose was to provide government agencies
with an individual's bank records to facilitate "criminal, tax and regula-
tory investigations and proceedings."65 The BSA essentially required ba-
sic record keeping by banks and other financial institutions of account
holders' names and financial instruments, and major currency and inter-
national transactions.66 Despite the law's breadth, it provided little in
procedural safeguards.67
In 1978, Congress remedied some privacy deficiencies in the BSA
with the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA).68 The RFPA restricts
government access to individual or small partnership banking records
meeting BSA requirements. The government must be authorized by the
customer or have a judicial or administrative subpoena, search warrant,
or a special RFPA formal written request to obtain those records.69 In
essence, the BSA turns financial institutions into clearinghouses for pri-
vate financial transaction information subject only to the procedural safe-
guards of the RFPA. The law has been criticized for its limited breadth,
governing only federal agencies instead of state and local agencies and
private parties, and its limitation to individuals and small partnerships.70
C. Investigatory Powers
Federal, state, and local governments and private parties possess sig-
nificant power to discover private financial information in the United
States. One of the most internationally controversial of these powers is
the grand jury's investigatory power. Many nations do not recognize
grand jury investigations as part of the judicial process. 71 A subpoena
issued under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure can be
64 Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-59 (1991)).
65 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b(a)(1), 1951(a) (1991).
66 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(c)-(e) (1991). The BSA also granted subsequent rule-making power to the
Secretary of the Treasury. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(b) (1991). While currency and foreign transfer report-
ing is limited to large transactions in the United States, reporting and restrictions provide the basis of
control for nations with soft currencies and central bank currency controls.
67 See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
68 Right to Financial Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978) (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (1991)). See infra notes 90-93.
69 12 U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3408 (1991).
70 Politics of Contraband, supra note 59, at 681. But see supra notes 58-63 and accompanying
text (doctrines protecting such information from state authority).




served in the United States or abroad.72 Failure to comply without ade-
quate excuse may be contempt of court.7 3 Contempt can result in impris-
onment for individuals74 and substantial fines for banks and other
corporations.75 In the case of foreign service, the subpoena may "require
the appearance [of or the] production of a specified document by [a na-
tional or resident of the United States], if the court finds [either is] in the
interest of justice ....
Federal and state agencies also possess broad discretion under civil
investigative powers and administrative subpoenas. Many procedural
rights for criminal subpoenas do not extend to agency demands. 77 The
Interstate Commerce Act was the first statute to authorize administrative
subpoenas, although other agencies have been given comparable investi-
gatory powers;78 demands can be made of both investigatory targets and
third parties.7 9 Subpoenas issued under these laws are both broad and
powerful.8 0 Administrative subpoenas raise enforcement questions simi-
72 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(e). Foreign service is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1991).
73 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g).
74 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 205-206 (1988) [hereinafter Doe].
75 Westinghouse, supra note 19, at 994 (company failing to comply with the District Court dis-
covery order was required to pay $10,000 per day and, upon failure of the company to pay the fine,
the United States Marshal was authorized and directed to enter the company's uranium mine
properties and seize any and all properties of sufficient value to satisfy the fine (reversed by appeals
court)); Nova Scotia II, supra note 10, at 819-820 (court imposed a $25,000 per day fine which
reached $1,825,000 (upheld by panel)); Sealed Case, supra note 6, at 499 (fine against bank was
$50,000 per day (reversed by court of appeals)).
76 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) (1991).
77 Oklahoma Press, supra note 60, at 214 ("Congress has authorized the Administrator.. .to
determine the question of coverage in the preliminary investigation of possibly existing viola-
tions ... ."); see also infra note 80.
78 See, eg., 47 U.S.C. §§ 208, 403 (1991) (Federal Communications Commission); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 49, 50 (1991) (Federal Trade Commission); 49 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 305, 916, 301, 1017 (1991) (In-
terstate Commerce Commission); 29 U.S.C. §§ 159, 160 (1991) (National Labor Relations Board);
15 U.S.C. §§ 77s, 77v, 78u, 79r, 80a-41, 80b-9 (1991) (Securities and Exchange Commission) (cited
in J. STEIN, G. MITCHELL, & B. MEZINES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 19.03, at 19-45 n.3 (1990)).
A variety of state agencies also possess significant civil investigatory powers. For example, 26
state and territorial antitrust law enforcement units have specific civil investigatory powers and 16
others have general investigatory powers. See W. HAYNES, STATE ANTITRUST LAWS 274-356
(1989).
79 B. SCHWARZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 137 (3d ed. 1991). See, eg., Vanguard Int'l Manufac-
turing v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 1229, 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("The IRS's authority to issue
third-party summonses is very broad." (citations omitted)); Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Banca della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) [hereinafter BSI]. But see First Chi-
cago, supra note 7, at 345-346; see also infra notes 268-271.
80 Agencies do not need probable cause to issue their subpoenas. United States v. Morton Salt
Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950) (The "power to [administrative] inquisition.., is more analogous
to a Grand Jury, which... can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even
because it wants assurance that it is not."). See, eg., 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1991) ("For the purpose of
any such investigation .... any ... officer designated by [the Securities and Exchange Commission]
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lar to grand jury subpoenas for international comity purposes .8 Fur-
thermore, state subpoenas are not subject to RFPA restrictions, thus
eliminating the due process guarantees therein. 2
Private parties can obtain private bank information through civil
discovery. The Federal Rules limit discovery to "any matter, not privi-
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action,"' 83 which need not itself be admissible as evidence at trial.84
While "traditional" privileged material cannot be discovered,85 it re-
mains unclear whether a foreign banker-client privilege constitutes a
traditional privilege. In enacting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Congress left "it up to the courts to interpret the common law principles
in light of reason and experience."816 Commentators have noted an evolv-
ing "semi-privilege" for discovery "that would invade the privacy of per-
sons not parties to the action, ' 87 but the recent evolution of the semi-
privilege leaves its status questionable, and federal courts have shown
little inclination to broaden the traditional privilege categories.
8 8
D. Constitutional Privilege
The Constitution provides little protection for account holders.
Courts describe the interest of the United States in enforcing its laws as
overwhelming and the ability of prosecutors to uncover evidence of crim-
inal conduct as essential.89 That interest usually overwhelms any possi-
ble constitutional right of a bank customer. United States v. Miller90
rejected the Fourth Amendment's Search and Seizure Clause9' as a basis
for a privacy right in bank records. The Supreme Court held that in a
case where the records were held pursuant to the BSA, "[t]he depositor
is empowered to administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance,
take evidence, and require the production of any books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, or
other records which the Commission deems relevant or material to the inquiry.") (emphasis added).
81 See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, A CASEBOOK 187 (3d ed. 1988) (citing CFTC v.
Nahas, 580 F. Supp. 245 (D.D.C. 1983)).
82 See supra note 70; see also supra note 78.
83 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
84 F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.3, at 231 (1985).
85 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
86 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2016, at Supp. 54 (Supp.
1991).
87 J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.4, at 386 n.13 (citing
Valley Bank, supra note 59).
88 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 86, § 2020, at 178.
89 Field, supra note 6, at 408-409; Nova Scotia 1, supra note 10, at 1391; Nova Scotia 1I, supra
note 10, at 829.
90 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) [hereinafter Miller].
91 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will
be conveyed by that person to the Government." 92 Moreover, since the
bank owned the records, there was, "no legitimate 'expectation of pri-
vacy' [by Miller] in [the checks and deposit slips]." 93 According to later
decisions, Bahamian and Cayman protected bank records similarly fail to
provide a legitimate expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amend-
ment because of the exceptions to secrecy in the statutes themselves.94
The status of the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause95 re-
mains unclear. In a grand jury investigation, the question of whether an
individual can be compelled to testify when the testimony may result in
foreign prosecution, rests upon whether the party has a "real fear" of
prosecution. 96 This proves especially important where bank employees
are required to testify about records in violation of foreign law.97 The
Courts of Appeal adopted different tests to determine if that real fear
exists in foreign jurisdictions. While most circuits adopted a "case by
case" approach to determine whether individuals subpoenaed before the
grand jury must testify in spite of that fear,98 one circuit limited the right
not to testify to cases where an individual fears prosecution in another
nation that guarantees protection similar to the Fifth Amendment.99
The D.C. Circuit found that fear of prosecution is unfounded where a
person is not a citizen of the prosecuting nation and does not fear extra-
dition, almost regardless of other contacts, because the fear would only
be speculative.1 "0
Another investigative technique used in grand jury investigations in-
volves consent directives, as an apparent attempt to accommodate the
92 Miller, supra note 90, at 443. The decision failed to explain why the contractual relationship
between banker and client was to be ignored. See Tournier, supra note 55.
93 Miller, supra note 90, at 442.
94 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 732 n.4 (1980) [hereinfterPayner] (Bahamian account);
United States v. Mann, 829 F.2d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 1987) (Cayman Islands account). But see gener-
ally infra note 269.
95 "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ..
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
96 Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972). Banks and
other institutions cannot invoke the self incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. Doe, supra
note 74, at 206 (citing Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 102 (1988) [hereinafter Braswell] and
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1974) [hereinafter Bellis]).
97 See, eg., cases cited supra notes 6 and 7.
98 For a discussion of the "case by case" approach, see Sidestepping Foreign Bank Secrecy, supra
note 46, at 77-85.
99 United States v. (Under Seal), 794 F.2d 920, 925 (4th Cir.), stay granted sub non. Araneta v.
United States, 478 U.S. 1301, stay vacated and cerL denied, 479 U.S. 924 (1986).
100 Sealed Case, supra note 6, at 497. But see id. at 498 (Bank owned by country X should not be
forced to violate secrecy laws of country Y or face contempt sanctions).
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banks subject to foreign secrecy laws.101 Essentially, the government di-
rects a witness to sign a statement declaring that "if" a bank account
exists in a secrecy jurisdiction bank and the bank "thinks" the witness
has control, the bank should provide the government with all records of
that account. 10 2 The Supreme Court recently found such compulsion
consistent with the Fifth Amendment in Doe v. United States (Doe).
10 3
In that case, a district court held "John Doe" in contempt for refusing to
sign a consent form in an investigation of his alleged tax law violations
and suspected fraudulent manipulation of oil cargoes. 4 The petitioner
claimed that his execution of the consent form would have independent
testimonial significance and the Fifth Amendment prohibited the govern-
ment from compelling his signature.105 The Court held the consent di-
rective itself was not "testimonial" because its execution held no
testimonial significance; therefore, the Fifth Amendment was not impli-
cated. 106 Justice Blackmun noted that a question of comity could exist in
such cases, but found that it was not implicated in Doe.'
1 7
Other cases have entirely stripped Fifth Amendment protection.
Corporate custodians have no Fifth Amendment protection because they
hold records in a representative capacity.' 08 This is true even if the cus-
101 D. McGoWaN, D. O'DAY, & K. NORTH, CRIMINAL AND CIVIL TAX FRAUD § 11.06 (Supp.
1991).
102 For examples of the form of such statements, see, e.g., United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814,
815-816 n.1 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984); Doe, supra note 74, at 204 n.2; In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, Yanagihara Grand Jury, 709 F. Supp. 192, 194 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 1989) [hereinafter
Yanagihara].
103 Doe, supra note 74.
104 The district court originally found such compulsion to be in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment's self-incrimination clause in In re Grand Jury Investigation, United States v. Doe, 599 F.
Supp. 746 (S.D. Tex. 1984) which was reversed on the initial appeal. On remand, the district court
ordered Doe to sign the consent form and held him in contempt when he refused. This appeal
followed.
105 Doe, supra note 74, at 207.
106 Id. at 215-217.
107 Id. at 218 n.16. Whether this holding would have any actual effect in the Cayman Islands
remained unclear. The Grand Court of the Cayman Islands held expressly that consent directives
compelled under threat of contempt sanctions do not constitute consent under the Cayman Bank
Secrecy Law. Id., citing In re ABC Ltd., 1984 C.I.L.R. 130 (1984), although that decision had not
been appealed. Whether a defendant has standing to raise the comity issue in a consent directive
context has also been questioned. Yanagihara, supra note 102, at 195.
The dissent in Doe by Justice Stevens was not particularly persuasive. He based his opinion on
the belief that "forced execution of a document that purports to convey the signer's author-
ity... invade[s] the dignity of the human mind," and the fact that the majority failed to recognize
that the directive itself creates "new facts... [probative of control] that may be used against peti-
tioner." Id. at 219 n.1 and 221 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Exactly where
protection of dignity is enunciated constitutionally was not explained.
108 Bellis, supra note 96, at 88.
Foreign Bank Secrecy
12:454(1992)
todian is a named co-defendant 0 9 but not if the corporation is operated
as a sole proprietorship. 110 These cases are of particular importance for
individuals operating private offshore banks"' who would generally lose
their Fifth Amendment protection because of their bank's corporate
form.
IV. THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Because of the conflict between domestic and foreign policies and
procedures, nations attempt to cooperate when possible to meet the needs
of each. Their efforts include treaties, informal agreements, and multilat-
eral cooperation to improve upon the traditional non-treaty mechanisms
for obtaining evidence abroad.
A. Non-Treaty Mechanisms for Obtaining Evidence Abroad
Letters rogatory are the oldest bilateral procedure for obtaining in-
formation in a foreign jurisdiction. "Letters rogatory are the medium...
whereby one country, speaking through one of its courts, requests an-
other country, acting through its own courts and by methods of court
procedure peculiar thereto and entirely within the latter's control, to as-
sist the administration of justice in the former country .... 12 Based on
international comity, '" nations ordinarily grant such requests absent un-
usual circumstances." 4 Letters rogatory can be used for both private
and government actions.
Although letters rogatory can produce information, several draw-
backs limit their value. First, few specific procedures exist with respect
to letters rogatory. 15  While some nations require a formal request
109 Braswell, supra note 96, at 120 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 104, citing United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
111 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
112 The Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819, 820 (E.D. La. 1941). See also In re Westinghouse Electric Corp.
and Duquesne Light Co., 16 O.R.2d 273, 290 (1977) [hereinafter Duquesne Light] ("The enforce-
ment of letters rogatory is always a matter within the discretionary power of the Court.").
113 "Comity refers to the spirit of cooperation in which a domestic tribunal approaches the reso-
lution of cases touching the laws and interests of other sovereign states." Soci&6 Nationale Indus-
trielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 543 n.27 (1987) [hereinafter
Socidtd Nationale].
'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of
mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895), reaffirmed in Socidt6Nationale, supra, at 542-43. See
Duquesne Light, supra note 112, at 290-91.
114 See The Signe, supra note 112, at 820.
115 There is a treaty concerning letters rogatory, European Convention on Mutual Assistance in
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through diplomatic channels, others do not. Even when the letter can be
directly sent from the domestic court to the foreign court, the procedure
still takes time. To discover the correct procedures requires litigants to
expend not only extensive time but also money, a second drawback to the
procedure." 6 Third, the letter itself must be simple enough to be under-
stood but sufficiently complete to convince a foreign judge to act.' 17 This
requires careful drafting to avoid confusion with U.S. legal terms and
peculiar names for offenses. Fourth, the foreign procedure may prevent
the domestic party from obtaining sufficient information. Because the
letters rogatory process is limited by the laws and procedures of the juris-
diction, foreign judges might not assist U.S. courts; this is especially so
with fiscal offenses (i.e. currency, securities, or tax offenses)." 8
Finally, other nations have a general antipathy for U.S. litigation
procedures and practice. Many countries find it unreasonable to compel
individuals to expend extensive time, effort, and money to produce
records for an adverse party on a fishing expedition.' 9  Similarly, foreign
jurisdictions often do not recognize United States grand jury and admin-
istrative procedures as valid bases for letters rogatory because they do
not meet their "judicial proceeding" requirement for answering a letter
rogatory. 120 Parties have no certainty that the procedure will be success-
ful in procuring information,' 2 ' particularly when attempting to over-
Criminal Matters, opened for signature Apr. 20, 1959, 472 U.N.T.S. 185, but "[t]he Convention does
not really create any new procedures for obtaining evidence. It provides a procedure for executing
letters rogatory, but does not expand on this mechanism for securing evidence." Knapp, Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaties as a Way To Pierce Bank Secrecy, 20 CAsE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 405, 406
n.4 (1988) (emphasis added).
116 Nova Scotia , supra note 10, at 1390. Even when a letter can be directly sent from the domes-
tic court to the foreign court, the procedure still takes time. The letter must be submitted by counsel
to the domestic court, approved, and then sent via diplomatic channels to the foreign court. The
foreign court must collect the information and return it by the same process. RESTATEMENT
THIRD, supra note 14, at § 473 reporters' note 1. When the government is the requestor, the letter
must also follow the appropriate bureaucratic path before reaching the domestic court, adding fur-
ther delay. Address by James Springer, Washington, D.C. Bar Association, International Law Sec-
tion's Narco-Terrorism and International Law Forum (Oct. 20, 1989), Federal News Service
(available on NEXIS).
117 Knapp, supra note 115, at 409.
118 Id. at 409-10. See Vetco, supra note 10, at 1333 ("The Swiss Federal Attorney has stated that
tax investigations are fiscal matters, and that it would be unable to respond favorably to a letter
rogatory."). Cf Duquesne Light, supra note 112, at 286-287 ("The Court is entitled to go behind
letters rogatory, to examine precisely what it is the foreign Court is seeking to do, and to give effect
to them only if they satisfy the requirements of the law of this jurisdiction.").
119 RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 14, at § 442 reporters' note I.
120 Knapp, supra note 115, at 410. The United States usually accepts requests from administra-
tive authorities and foreign nations often provide assistance to private parties engaged in administra-
tive proceedings. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 14, at § 473 comment c.
121 Nova Scotia I, supra note 10, at 1390.
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come bank secrecy laws.122 For these reasons, letters rogatory are often
used as a last resort when evidence cannot otherwise be compelled, espe-
cially in the case of bank records protected by foreign law.
Employed only in civil matters,' 23 the Hague Evidence Convention
has, for some nations, supplanted the use of letters rogatory.124 Civil law
nations interpret the Hague Convention as not applying to criminal, gov-
ernment fiscal, or administrative matters, "as well as other cases in which
the government is the plaintiff." '125 The Convention itself also effectively
excludes injunctions and restraining orders.12 6 This leaves letters roga-
tory or procedures established under treaties as the only available
alternative.
B. Bilateral Agreements
L Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
Faced with the problems of transboundary litigation and crime,
among others, the United States started negotiating bilateral treaties
designed to effectuate a better system of obtaining evidence and piercing
bank secrecy. The mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) between the
United States and Switzerland (Swiss Treaty)' 27 was the first of these
treaties. It created an obligation between the nations "to afford each
other.., mutual assistance" in investigations and the return of property
122 Id.
123 For example, Switzerland and the Canadian provinces regularly execute letters rogatory. RE-
STATEMENT THIRD, supra note 14, at § 473 reporters' note 1. But see infra notes 133, 276 and
accompanying text.
124 Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for
signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (implemented in 28
U.S.C. §§ 1781-82 (1991), Fed. R. Civ. P. 28(b)) [hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention]. The
formal channels of the Hague Evidence Convention have been termed an "extremely slow and ex-
pensive" process. To Amend the Federal Securities Laws in Order to Facilitate Cooperation Between
the United States and.Foreign Countries in Securities Law Enforcement, 1988: Hearing on S. 2544
Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 776 (1988) (statement of David Ruder, Chairman, SEC). Although the Hague
Evidence Convention can be used in government civil actions with common law countries, its use is
not required. See SocitJ Nationale, supra note 113, at 542-543. For a discussion of Socidtd Nation-
ale, the Hauge Evidence Convention, and its use in France, Italy, Germany, and the United King-
dom, see Prescott & Alley, Effective Evidence-Taking Under the Hague Convention, 22 INT'L LAW.
939 (1988).
125 Prescott & Alley, supra note 124, at 947.
126 Id. at 948.
127 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, United States-Switzerland, May 25,1973,
27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (entered into force Jan. 23, 1977) [hereinafter Swiss MLAT]. For
a general discussion of U.S. MLATs, see Ellis & Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assist-
ance in Criminal Matters A Comparative Analysis, 19 INT'L LAW. 189 (1985).
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obtained through crimes. 128 Although every bilateral MLAT negotiated
by the United States has been tailored to the specific needs of the con-
tracting parties, they tend to have some common elements. 129 The trea-
ties generally exclude political, military, and in some cases, tax
offenses.13° Employing a "dual criminality" prerequisite, 131 these treaties
require that the offense either be a crime in both nations or a crime listed
in the treaty. Nations limit the use of information to the purpose in the
assistance request in order to prevent circumvention of the dual criminal-
ity requirement. 132 The treaties also establish general guidelines for the
evidence request process.
133
Since the Swiss Treaty, the United States has negotiated MLATs
with a number of other nations. 134 A treaty with the Netherlands, in-
cluding the bank haven Dutch-Antilles, became the second major secrecy
jurisdiction MLAT in 1983.135 The Senate approved six other treaties in
October 1989, with the reservation that mutual assistance would not be
given to foreign officials involved in the drug trade. 136 These included
treaties with the Bahamas (Bahamian MLAT) 137 and Cayman Islands
(Cayman MLAT),13 both secrecy havens, as well as Canada, a blocking
128 Id. at art. 1, l(a), (b).
129 The Swiss MLAT is far more detailed than most other MLATs, but the elements of other
MLATs are essentially variations on the same themes.
130 Swiss MLAT, supra note 127, at art. 2, 1(c)(1)-(3), (5); infra notes 143-44 and accompany-
ing text.
131 Id. at art. 4 and Schedule. But in this regard, commentators hope the new Belgian MLAT,
Treaty on Legal Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Jan. 28, 1988, United States-Belgium, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 16, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) [hereinafter Belgian MLAT], will become the
international model "since it applies to 'any offense under the laws of the [assistance] Requesting
State' unless otherwise provided by the treaty." See Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Concerning the
Cayman Islands, S. EXEC. REP. No. 101-8, 101st Cong., 1st Seas. 209 (1989) [hereinafter Cayman
Treaty Report] (Statement of Bruce Zagaris, Editor-in-Chief, Int'l Enforcement L. Rep.).
132 Id. at art. 5.
133 Id. at arts. 28-35.
134 Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 7, 1979, United
States-Turkey, 32 U.S.T. 3111, T.I.A.S. No. 9891; Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters, Nov. 9, 1982, United States-Italy, 24 I.L.M. 1536 (entered into force Nov. 13, 1985).
135 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, June
12, 1981, United States-Netherlands, T.I.A.S. No. 10,734, 21 I.L.M. 48 (1982) (entered into force
Sept. 15, 1983).
136 Several senators, notably Senator Jesse Helms, objected to the treaties because some govern-
ments had drug trafficking ties and could not be trusted to share information. See Cayman Treaty
Report, supra note 131, at 258-75. The reservations are a result of those objections. Senate Votes 6
Pacts To Track Drug Money, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1989, at A14, col. 3.
137 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Aug. 18, 1987, United States-Bahamas, S.
TREATY Doc. 17, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) [hereinafter Bahamian MLAT].
138 Treaty Concerning the Cayman Islands Relating to Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal




law jurisdiction.'39 The United States signed a treaty with Colombia, but
Colombia apparently will not ratify the treaty due to strong domestic
opposition. 40 A Jamaican treaty also awaits approval by both sides
41
while negotiations for a Panamanian MLAT continue. 42
The Bahamian and Cayman MLATs both have important restric-
tions on information relating to tax matters. Under the Bahamian treaty,
the contracting state must only provide assistance in tax matters where
the "offence" involves narcotics, theft, violence, or dual crimes. 143 The
Cayman MLAT similarly excludes tax and currency offenses not relating
to another criminal matter.'" While the Caribbean MLATs were only
recently approved, both the United States and its early treaty partners
consider MLATs a success. Swiss Justice Minister Elisabeth Kopp
stated that the Swiss seem satisfied with the arrangement, even though
U.S. requests outpace Swiss requests three to one. 45  Commentators
139 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 18, 1985, United States-Can-
ada, 24 I.L.M. 1092 (1985). The other three treaties are the Belgian MLAT, supra note 131; Mutual
Legal Assistance Cooperation Treaty, Dec. 9, 1987, United States-Mexico, S. TREATY Doc. No. 13,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); and Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 19,
1986, United States-Thailand, S. TREATY Doc. No. 18, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
140 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, Aug. 20, 1980, United States-Colombia, T.I.A.S. No. 10,734
(not yet entered into force); Knapp, supra note 115, at 413 n.30.
141 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, United States-Jamaica (notyet entered into
force), cited by Daily Report for Executives (BNA), June 1, 1990, at G-3 (comments of James
Springer) (available on NEXIS).
142 Knapp, supra note 115, at 414.
143 Bahamian MLAT, supra note 137, at art. 2, §§ 1, 2. British, and consequently Bahamian,
Common law treats tax avoidance, as opposed to tax evasion, as it is in the United States. See
Karzon, International Tax Evasion: Spawned in the United States and Nurtured by Secrecy Havens,
16 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 757, 759 n.2 (1983).
144 Cayman MLAT, supra note 138, at arts. 3, % 1(a), 19, 3(d), (e). Insider trading issues will be
interesting to watch under the Cayman MLAT. The treaty's definition of "Criminal offense," art.
19, 3, includes "insider trading" which is defined as "the offer, purchase, or sale of securities by
any person while in possession of material non-public information directly or indirectly relating to
the securities offered, purchased, or sold, in breach of a legally binding duty of trust or confidence."
Id. at art. 19, 3(g) (emphasis added). This is a more limited definition than has been advanced by
the SEC and some United States courts. Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-3 (1990); United States v.
Chestman, 704 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), rev'd, 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), reh'g en banc
granted, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,439 (1990).
Previous bilateral treaties limited to narcotics matters also allowed the Federal government to
obtain financial information for tax felony prosecution if the fiscal offenses were related to narcotics
crimes. See, eg., United States v. Pinto, 838 F.2d 426, 430 (10th Cir. 1988).
145 The Swiss Case on Insiders Taxes and Evidence, Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1987, at 33. "The Swiss
Treaty is the model that we look to for the most productive treaty we have. The Netherlands is a
close second." Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and the Regulations Implementing the Bank
Secrecy AcL" Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions, Supervision, Regulation and
Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 27
(1987) (statement of William Weld, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division) [hereinafter
Money Laundering Hearings].
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have suggested that the United States "could be expected to make the
majority of the requests under treaties with bank secrecy jurisdic-
tions," 146 such as the Bahamas and Cayman Islands.
The United States improves "treaty performance" after ratification
through less formal means. United States pressure, both indirect
through international organizations 47 and direct, has proved instrumen-
tal in changing foreign laws without new agreements. Direct pressure is
brought upon nations to enact new legislation, bringing new offenses
within dual criminality requirements. 14  But considering the breadth of
the new Caribbean MLATs and their corresponding strict limits relating
to tax crimes, this form of creeping treaty will probably not contribute to
future Caribbean MLATs for tax purposes.
149
MLATs provide a number of advantages to government investiga-
tors gathering secret foreign bank information. After they enter into
force, processing a request for evidence merely requires contacting the
treaty-specified representative in the other jurisdiction. MLATs also
constitute a formal treaty, within the Senate's constitutional "advise and
consent" requirement,"5° which U.S. lawmakers and administrators can
supplement with new domestic laws and regulations to further refine in-
formation procurement techniques.
From the U.S. government's perspective, MLATs do not represent
complete solutions. They do not contain all of the offenses the United
States would prefer; this problem stems more from general international
relations than the specific MLATs. Nations that do not regard certain
activities as criminal understandably are unwilling to enter into agree-
ments to assist in the prosecution of people in other nations; 151 the same
146 Knapp, supra note 115, at 416.
147 See infra notes 189-200 and accompanying text.
148 Roth, Swiss Urged to Curb Money Laundering, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1988, at A12, col. 1. Some
Swiss attribute their new insider trading law to U.S. pressure. Melloan, Switzerland's 'Glasnost' Has
Roots in the USA, Wall St. J., June 28, 1988, at 33, col. 3. Some United States officials attribute the
Swiss money laundering law to pressure by the United States and others. See infra notes 189-95.
The new law enables U.S. law enforcement agencies to obtain evidence under the more formal proce-
dures of the Swiss MLAT.
149 See supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
150 "[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur...." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
151 See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. Cayman Financial Secretary Thomas Jeffer-
son noted while commenting on his nation's aversion to any tax agreements, "[one reason [for
agreements not covering tax offenses] is that we really have no direct taxation. With no taxation,
signing a treaty with another country is just a way of policing for them." Peagam, Future Growth
That Doesn't Scare the World, EUROMONEY, May 1989, Supp. at 67. The other reason is respect for
confidentiality. Id. See Offshore Financial Centers, supra note 44, at 527-28 n.46.
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reservations exist with respect to U.S. litigation techniques.15 2 Some of-
fenses also technically fall outside the dual criminality requirements of
MLATs. The new Swiss insider trading law exemplifies this difficulty.
Because the Swiss definition of insider trading remains more limited than
the SEC's, some SEC inquiries could still fall outside the Swiss Treaty's
dual criminality requirements.1 53 This problem, however, seems to be
limited to more technical crimes and cases.
154
The United States also limits the effectiveness of MLATs through its
own doing. The last six treaties languished in the Senate eighteen to
twenty-four months awaiting Senate advice and consent. 155 Such inac-
tion not only limits the timely use of MLATs, but also makes the United




The United States presently has forty tax treaties in force and sev-
eral others in various stages of negotiation. 56 These treaties provide for
the direct exchange of information between competent authorities.
157
Like securities, antitrust, and narcotics agreements, as well as MLATs,
these treaties are limited by domestic law and often generate abundant
domestic case law.
1 58
On February 24, 1983, the Reagan administration announced the
Caribbean Basin Initiative.15 9 The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery
152 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
153 See Melloan, supra note 148. See also supra note 144.
154 Most traditional laws against violent and non-violent crimes have counterparts in other sys-
tems. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986)
("murdering thousands of Jews and non-Jews" under Israeli law is an extraditable offense under the
U.S.-Israeli extradition treaty's "murder" definition).
155 REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF SEMINAR, "INTERNATIONAL DRUG MONEY LAUNDERING:
ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS," JUNE 21, 1990, PREPARED FOR THE HOUSE COMM. ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS BY THE CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE LIB. OF CONG. 22 (Comm. Print 1990)
(statement of Andre K. Surena, Assistant Legal Adviser, Law Enforcement and Intelligence, U.S.
Dept. of State) [hereinafter ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS].
156 D. McGOWEN, D. O'DAY, & K. NORTH, supra note 101, at § 11.03. Two regional tax trea-
ties also exist among the five Scandanavian nations and the members of the European Community.
See Crinion, Information Gathering on Tax Evasion in Tax Haven Countries, 20 INT'L LAW. 1209,
1243 (1986).
157 Id.
158 See, e.g., id. at 323-24 (Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions under the United States-Swit-
zerland Tax Treaty).
159 "The initiative was originally proposed in an address to the Organization of American States.
The major elements of the plan were a free trade area, economic and military aid, investment tax
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Act (CBERA), 1° designed to implement the initiative, contained a sec-
tion promoting the negotiation of tax treaties with Caribbean tax havens.
Under CBERA, U.S. corporations can deduct the costs of attending con-
ventions in Caribbean nations if those nations have negotiated tax trea-
ties with the United States.161 These tax treaties must allow the United
States to procure information needed for criminal or civil tax proceedings
regardless of local bank secrecy laws.162 The effect of CBERA has not
been overwhelming. Of the nations originally designated as beneficiary




Narcotics agreements, like tax and securities agreements, are execu-
tive agreements and thus not subject to the Senate's advise and consent
procedure.165 According to their stated purpose, these agreements only
apply to crimes involving narcotics trafficking and are intended to be
interim in nature, expiring once broader assistance treaties come into
force.166 The United States has negotiated several treaties with various
United Kingdom commonwealth states in the Caribbean,167 although
those treaties have been superseded by the broader Cayman MLAT. 18
credits, and programs designed to encourage private investment and production in the Caribbean."
Offshore Financial Centers, supra note 44, at 521 n.7.
160 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Title II, Pub. L. No. 98-67,97 Stat. 384 (codified in
various sections of Titles 19, 26, and 31 of the U.S. Code) (1983) [hereinafter CBERA].
161 The IRS disallows expenses for conventions outside North America. A nation qualifies as
North American if it has been designated a "beneficiary country" under CBERA and has negotiated
an information exchange agreement with the United States. D. McGOWEN, D. O'DAY & K.
NoRTH, supra note 101, at § 11.05. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 also contains provisions that
encourage corporations to establish Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC) in Caribbean countries. "An
FSC can exempt a part of its export income from United States income tax if the FSC meets certain
foreign management and economic process requirements." FSC host and CBERA requirements are
essentially the same. Offshore Financial Centers, supra note 44, at 537 n.103.
162 I.R.C. § 274(h)(6)(C)(1990).
163 The President designated Antigua and Baruba, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, Do-
minican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherlands An-
tilles, Panama, St. Christopher-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and
Tobago, and the British Virgin Islands as beneficiary nations. D. McGOWEN, D. O'DAY, & K.
NoRTH, supra note 101, at § 11.05.
164 Barbados, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, and St. Lucia. Id.; Tax Report
Briefs, Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1989, at Al, col. 5. The United States also has agreements with Ber-
muda, Netherlands-Antilles, and Aruba.
165 See supra note 150.
166 Knapp, supra note 115, at 412-13.
167 Id. at 413 (these include Angnilla, British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, and Turks & Caicos
Islands).
168 Cayman MLAT, supra note 138, at Protocol.
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One State Department official described this sort of treaty as irrational
but recognized that "historical, financial, political, [and] economic rea-




The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) actively pursues
violations of U.S. securities laws outside the United States. Most of these
efforts center around major industrialized nations and their securities
markets. 7 The SEC has negotiated a number of Memoranda of Under-
standing (MOUs) with nations possessing major markets.' 71 The Com-
mission also requires that every inter-exchange linkage agreement subject
to SEC approval contain a clause providing for the sharing of informa-
tion, and cooperation in surveillance and investigations.172 With the ex-
ception of Switzerland, however, these various agreements do not affect
practices in secrecy havens.
d. Antitrust
The United States has negotiated three bilateral antitrust agree-
ments. The first with West Germany 173 merely represented a codifica-
tion of mechanisms of cooperation used to enforce similar antitrust
169 ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS, supra note 155, at 21-22 (statement of Andre K.
Surena) ("If a foreign government is [willing to permit] piercing [of] bank secrecy in cases of narcot-
ics trafficking, why should it not allow [the same] in the case of murder for hire.., or fraud?") Id.
170 Cf. Bloomentha, The SEC and Internationalization of Capital Markets: Herein of Regulation
Sand Rule 144A-Part II, 19 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 343, 348 n.32 (1991) (noting the markets
included and excluded in the new Regulation S).
171 These include agreements with the United Kingdom's Department of Trade and Industry,
Japan's Ministry of Finance, Brazil's Comiss5o de Valores Mobilfirios (Brazil's SEC), and the securi-
ties commissions of France, Mexico, Switzerland, the Netherlands, British Columbia, Ontario, and
Quebec. SEC, Mexico Sign MOU Regarding Enforcement, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at
1518 (Oct. 26, 1990). See Goelzer & Sullivan, Obtaining Evidence for the International Enforcement
of the United States Securities Laws, 16 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 145, 170-71 (1990). The SEC is
negotiating an agreement with Germany and is undertaking preliminary negotiations with Sweden,
Norway, Denmark, and Finland who have entered into a securities agreement among themselves. 10
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.10 (H. Bloomenthal ed.
Supp. 1990); International Securities Enforcement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommuni-
cations and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1989)
(statement of David Ruder). One publication has described the growth of these agreements as,
"sprout[ing] like mushrooms." Tighter Belts, The Economist, Oct. 5, 1991, at 91.
172 See Peters, Overview of International Securities Regulation, 6 INT'L TAX & BUS. LAW. 229,
237-38 n.39 (1988).
173 Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June
23, 1976, United States-Federal Republic of Germany, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291, reprinted
in 15 I.L.M. 1282 (1976); A. LowE, supra note 15, at 228.
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laws.17 The other two, with Australia175 and Canada, 17 6 were negoti-
ated after the uranium cartel affair of the late 1970s. Both provide a
framework for communication and cooperation. 77 While such agree-
ments are important, they are limited to these three nations and exclude
major industrial trading partners such as Japan, France, and the United
Kingdom 17 as well as all non-industrial countries.
C. Multilateral Efforts
L The United Nations and the U.N. Drug Convention
The Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances (Narcotics Convention or Convention), adopted
on December 19, 1988 by the U.N. Narcotics Trafficking Conference,
represents an important cooperative effort towards international consen-
sus on the issues of narcotics trafficking and bank secrecy.1 79 The Nar-
cotics Convention accommodates and encourages other bilateral and
multilateral agreements to facilitate mutual legal assistance 8 ' and other
enforcement mechanisms.18'
In terms of piercing bank secrecy, the Convention offers a number of
procedural advantages for law enforcement agencies over traditional let-
ters rogatory and the patchwork bilateral assistance treaties. It requires
that mutual legal assistance be afforded for documents and records in-
cluding bank, financial, corporate, or business records in narcotics mat-
ters.'8 2 The Convention has sufficient breadth to embrace most business
174 Note, The United States-Australian Antitrust Cooperation Agreement: A Step in the Right Di-
rection, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 127, 164 (1983) [hereinafter Right Direction].
175 Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, United States-Australia, June 29,
1982, T.I.A.S. No. 10,365, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 702 (1982); A. LowE, supra note 15, at 233.
176 Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with Re-
spect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws, United States-Canada, Mar. 9, 1984, reprinted
in 23 I.L.M. 275 (1984).
177 See Right Direction, supra note 174; Leich, International Economic Law: Cooperation in Anti-
trust Matters, U.S.-Canada, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 659 (1984).
178 One commentator has proposed a U.S.-U.K. antitrust treaty. See Barbolak, Laker Airways:
Recognizing the Need for a United States-United Kingdom Antitrust Treaty, 4 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 39
(1986).
179 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, opened for
signature Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989) [hereinafter Narcotics Convention]. The United
States Senate ratified the treaty on Nov. 22, 1989 and President Bush signed it on Feb. 13, 1990.
U.S. DFP'T ST. DISPATCH, Sept. 3, 1990, at 59. Twenty nations must ratify the treaty for it to come
into effect. Narcotics Convention, supra, at art. 29.
180 Narcotics Convention, supra note 179, at art. 7, t 6, 20.
181 See id. at art. 5, 4(g) (confiscation); id. at art. 6, % 11 (extradition); id. at art. 10, % 3 (interna-
tional assistance for transit states); id. at art. 14, 1 4 (eliminating narcotics demand); and id. at art.
17, 1 9 (illicit traffic by sea).




records. The Convention promotes mutual assistance by eliminating the
right of signatories to refuse mutual assistance based on bank secrecy or
blocking laws.1 13 For signatories that are not parties to other bilateral or
multilateral MLATs, the Convention furnishes procedures to effectuate
this assistance.
1 8 4
Article 9 of the Narcotics Convention assists government agencies
by establishing a system for inter-agency channels of communication and
working groups.18 5 The Convention dictates that states shall "[e]stablish
and maintain channels of communication between [the nations'] compe-
tent agencies and services to facilitate the secure and rapid exchange of
information.. ." regarding drug trafficking and money laundering."8 6
Article 9 also provides for assistance in conducting inquiries,187 a historic
problem for U.S. grand jury investigations.
1 88
2. International Organizations
In 1983, a Congressional staff report noted that leading interna-
tional organizations "do not address [the] issues" of crime and se-
crecy.189 Since that time, the United States and other foreign
governments have worked within international organizations to promote
inter-governmental communication and to provide the groundwork for
both bilateral and multilateral agreements. Their efforts flow through a
number of organizations which generally focus on specific international
problems.
a. The Cooke Committee
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) was founded in 1930
to promote cooperation among central banks and facilitate financial op-
erations. 90 In an effort to address new international bank supervision
issues, the BIS created a new standing committee in 1974: the Commit-
tee on Bank Regulations and Supervisory Practices (Cooke Commit-
tee).191 The Cooke Committee, made up of the central bank and
183 Id. at art. 7, 5.
184 Id. at art. 7, 7. The procedures themselves are found at art. 7, 4 8-19.
185 Id. at art. 9. See infra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
186 Id. at art. 9, 1 l(a).
187 Id. at art. 9, 1(b).
188 See supra note 120.
189 STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 103.
190 Hackney & Shafer, The Regulation of International Banking: An Assessment of International
Institutions, I 1 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 475, 486.
191 The Committee is known as the "Basle Committee" after the Swiss city where the committee
meets and where the BIS is headquartered, or as the "Cooke Committee" after its chairman, Peter
Cooke of the Bank of England.
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supervisory agency officials of twelve nations,192 meets thrice yearly and
attempts to "strengthen... collaboration among national authorities in
their prudential supervision of international banking" and lessen the dan-
gers posed by uneven regulatory practices.
1 93
In 1986, the Cooke Committee started to consider the problem of
money laundering through the international payment system. Initially,
committee members solicited cooperation amongst themselves and edu-
cated each other on their different money laundering rules and regula-
tions.194  Thereafter, the Committee worked toward developing a
consensus on a code of conduct for bank monitoring and avoiding crimi-
nal use of the payment system. 195 In the past, the informal relationship
between the Federal Reserve and the other central banks has allowed the
U.S. government to obtain information when necessary without strict
formal arrangements and to pressure other governments into passing
laws against fiscal crimes. 19 6 The Cooke Committee was designed to
forge international bank policy based on similar cooperation among all of
the major banking nations. The implication of that design is that major
banking players establish standards and then press others into their
system.
b. INTERPOL
In October 1986, the INTERPOL General Assembly, acting on a
U.S. resolution, formed a working group to improve cooperation between
law enforcement agencies and financial institutions. The group focused
on sharing financial information in drug trafficking investigations, devel-
192 Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
193 Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Regulations Implementing the Bank Secrecy Act, and
Insider Fraud on Financial Institutions: Hearings Before the Subcomm on Financial Institutions Su-
pervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
100th Cong., 1st. Sess. 249 n.1 (1987) (statement of Manuel Johnson, Vice-Chairman, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System) [hereinafter Insider Fraud Hearings]. The Cooke Com-
mittee established general guidelines in 1975 in the Basle "Concordat" which provided non-
manditory recommendations for central banks. These included:
1. Surveillance and supervision of foreign banks should be the joint responsibility of parent
and host authorities.
2. No foreign bank should be able to evade/avoid supervision.
5. Ideally, international co-operation should be promoted by information exchanges between
host and parent authorities.
Reprinted in R. JOHNS, supra note 8, at 6.
194 R. JOHNS, supra note 8, at 211.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 212. Vice-Chairman Johnson attributed the Swiss passage of a money laundering stat-




oping guidelines, and establishing memoranda of understanding.197 At
the first meeting of the working group in March 1987, the United States
submitted a five point proposal for consideration. The United States rec-
ommended that:
1. Countries adopt codes of conduct similar to the Cooke Committee's
efforts;
2. Bank regulators, bank associations, and law enforcement agencies
adopt a "filter" or "point of contact" for law enforcement;
3. Banks, bank regulators, and bank associations use INTERPOL's facili-
ties to provide an information system for vetting prospective bank
personnel;
4. Countries adopt regulations requiring banks to report violations of all
laws to law enforcement authorities and that the information be shared
with banks, bank regulators, and bank associations;
5. Countries criminalize the laundering of money obtained from criminal
activities.
98
Three of the recommendations relate directly to improving commu-
nications between law enforcement organizations and banking profes-
sionals. Informal relationships generally facilitate the use of existing
exceptions to bank secrecy practices rather than create new legal access
to private information; but such informal relationships are considered
important by industry and government figures. The stain of illegal activi-
ties on a particular bank's reputation isolates it from reputable busi-
ness. 99 Similarly, the stain of illegal activities on a banking nation's
reputation isolates all of its banks from the international community.2 °°
The fourth INTERPOL recommendation would elevate bankers to
a quasi-law enforcement position. It would require either that bankers
make judgments as to what constitutes illegal activity, or it would require
the creation of guidelines for bankers to determine the legality of an ac-
tivity. In either case, it is unlikely that the goal could be achieved with-
out overriding some sort of secrecy privilege.
V. JUDICIAL COMPULSION
A. Pre-Restatement Comity
Prior to the publication of the Restatement (Second), Foreign Rela-
197 Money Laundering Hearings, supra note 145, at 11-12 (statement of Francis Keating, Assis-
tant Secretary for Enforcement and Operations, Department of Treasury); Insider Fraud Hearings,
supra note 193, at 325 (statement of Robert Serino, Deputy Chief Counsel (Operations), Office of
Comptroller of the Currency).
198 Insider Fraud Hearings, supra note 193, at 326-27 (statement of Robert Serino).
199 Fuhrman, The Bulgarian Connection, FORBEs, Apr. 17, 1989, at 40; R. JOHNS, supra note 8,
at 192.
200 Insider Fraud Hearings, supra note 193, at 214 (statement of Manuel Johnson).
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tions Law of the United States (Restatement Second) in 1965,21 two Sec-
ond Circuit cases, First National City Bank v. Internal Revenue Service
(Citibank 1)202 in 1959, followed by Ings v. Ferguson (Ings)203 ten
months later, considered the problems associated with foreign bank se-
crecy laws. In Citibank 1, the IRS served a summons on the bank at its
U.S. headquarters for documents held at its Panama City branch for a
Panamanian corporation with offices in New York City. The bank
moved to vacate or modify the summons claiming that compliance with
the summons would violate secrecy provisions of the Panamanian consti-
tution.24  The panel rejected this argument stating that the particular
provisions of the Panamanian constitution implicitly accepted this type
of investigation.2 "5
In Ings, a corporate bankruptcy trustee sought records from several
Canadian banks and served subpoenas on their New York branches for
records of transactions occurring at branches outside of the United
States.2 °6 The banks sought to quash the subpoenas. The appeals court
balanced several factors in the interest of comity, including the non-de-
fendant status of the banks and the foreign nature of the transactions and
records.2"7 In light of those factors, the panel decided to defer to Cana-
dian courts20" and delayed its decision until the Canadian courts had
ruled.20 9 If the Canadians determined that the disclosure would be in-
consistent with their law, the Second Circuit stated that it would grant a
motion to quash the subpoenas.21 0
Later courts criticized these opinions. They considered the failure
to distinguish between prescriptive jurisdiction in order issuance versus
201 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES (1965) [here-
inafter RESTATEMENT SECOND].
202 First Nat'l City Bank of New York v. Internal Revenue Service, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960) [hereinafter Citibank I].
203 Ings, supra note 1.
204 Citibank I, supra note 202, at 618.
205 Id. at 619-20.
206 Ings, supra note 1, at 150-151.
207 Id. at 152.
208 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
209 Ings, supra note 1, at 151-52.
210 Id. at 152. A.third case prior to the RESTATEMENT SECOND followed the deference analysis
in Ings. Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962) [hereinafter Chase],
involved facts similar to Citibank . In Chase, the bank presented its Panamanian counsel to testify
that the production of records without an order from a Panamanian official would constitute a mis-
demeanor under Panama law. The court modified the subpoena to allow the U.S. government to
pursue the matter with Panamanian officials and required Chase to comply with "its duty of actively
cooperating with the Government.. ." 297 F.2d at 613. Rejecting the government's contention that
Chase must show a good faith effort to comply with the subpoena, the panel found that Chase's
continuing duty of active cooperation constituted a good faith effort.
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enforcement jurisdiction in order enforcement and sanctions to be im-
proper.21 I As such, these holdings were not directly followed by courts
after the publication of the Restatement Second.
B. Comity and the Restatements
Because treaties, informal agreements, and international organiza-
tions provide only patchwork links through the broad range of financial
relationships, U.S. courts developed their own tests to solve conflicts
stemming from secrecy laws. To assist the courts, the American Law
Institute (ALl) published the Restatement Second. The Restatement
Second proposed a model balancing test to remedy jurisdictional con-
flicts. Section 40 stated that where two courts have prescriptive jurisdic-
tion and each could apply rules requiring inconsistent conduct,
international law requires each tribunal to consider, in moderating its
enforcement jurisdiction, such factors as:
(a) the vital national interests of each of the states;
(b) the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement ac-
tions would impose upon the person [before the courts];
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory
of the other state;
(d) the nationality of the person; and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably
be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.21 2
Many of the circuits adopted the section 40 test 13 while others did
not.2 14 Of the panels that used the formula, actual application was so
diverse that today's precedents do not represent a uniform test. While
the differing applications of the standard could be attributed to the fac-
tual differences in the cases, one commentator questioned whether the
cases were result-driven. 1 5
211 See Vetco, supra note 10, at 1330-1331; see also cases and sources cited supra note 10.
212 RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 201, at § 40 (emphasis added).
213 See infra notes 239-80 and accompanying text.
214 See infra notes 281-84 and accompanying text. See also Uranium Antitrust, supra note 19, at
1148, which stated:
Aside from the fact that the judiciary has little expertise, or perhaps even authority, to evaluate
the economic and social policies of a foreign country, such a balancing test is inherently un-
workable in this case. The competing interests here display an irreconcilable conflict on pre-
cisely the same plane of national policy.... It is simply impossible to judicially 'balance' these
totally contradictory and mutually negating actions.
This lack of expertise was noted in SocidtJ Nationale, supra note 113, at 552 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) ("Although transnational litigation is increasing, relatively few judges are experienced in the
area and the procedures of foreign legal systems are often poorly understood."); Laker Airways, Ltd.
v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Laker Airways].
215 O'Donnell, The Secrets of Foreign Bankers and the Federal Investigation: Tottering Balances,
20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 509, 538-39 (1988).
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In 1988, ALI published the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Pol-
icy Law of the United States (Restatement Third).2 16 In part because the
Restatement Second was not precisely tailored to conflicts between dis-
covery procedures and foreign laws barring document production,21 7 the
Restatement Third created a more detailed analytical structure for courts
to use. According to the Restatement Third, U.S. courts have "jurisdic-
tion to prescribe law with respect to (a) conduct that, wholly or in sub-
stantial part, takes place within its territory [and] (b) the status of
persons, or interests in things, present within its territory. '2 18  Civil dis-
covery, grand jury subpoenas, and agency demands represent legitimate
exercises of such jurisdiction.21  In the interest of comity, however,
courts should limit the exercise of that jurisdiction by the standard of
reasonableness. 220 Restatement Third section 403(2) states that courts
should determine reasonableness by considering:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, Le., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substan-
tial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regula-
tion is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regula-
tion to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is gen-
erally accepted;
(d) the existence ofjustified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
2 21
216 RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 14.
217 Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 512 (N.D. Ill. 1984) [hereinafter Graco].
218 RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 14, at § 402(1)(a)-(b). See Citibank I, supra note 202;
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
219 RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 14, at § 442 comments a, b:
A court or agency in the United States, when authorized by statute or rule of court, may order a
person subject to its jurisdiction to produce documents, objects, or other information relevant to
an action or investigation, even if the information or the person in possession of the information
is outside the United States.
RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 14, at § 442(1)(a).
220 Id. at § 403(1).
221 Id. at § 403(2)(a)-(h). The list of considerations is not exhaustive. Id. at § 403 comment b.
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If a U.S. court determines that jurisdiction exists, that court should
consider, in deciding whether to order production of information and in
framing a production order, factors in Restatement Third section
442(1)(c) including:
1) the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or
other information requested;
2) the degree of specificity of the request;
3) whether the information originated in the United States;
4) the availability of alternative means of securing the information; and
5) the extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request
would undermine important interests of the state where the information is
located.
222
If a court determines that issuing an order is appropriate and a for-
eign law or court order prohibits disclosure of the information, a U.S.
judge may enforce that order and, under section 442(2): a) require a
person to make a good faith attempt to secure permission from a foreign
authority to obtain requested information; b) impose sanctions of con-
tempt, dismissal, or default for failure to make a good faith effort or de-
liberately concealing or removing information; or c) make adverse
findings of fact for failure to obtain the requested information, regardless
of any good faith attempt to procure it.
223
The Restatement Third essentially divides judicial analysis in bank
secrecy and blocking law situations into three separate and structured
steps. First, a court should determine whether it should exercise jurisdic-
tion based on the section 403(2) "reasonableness test." If the court de-
cides it has jurisdiction, it should then consider other factors in the
section 442(1)(c) "order test" in deciding whether to issue an order and
how to phrase an order if its issuance were appropriate. Finally, if a
party fails to comply with an order, a judge should analyze the section
442(2) "enforcement test" to ascertain what, if any, penalty should be
assessed against the non-complying party.
The Restatement Third three-step analysis represents restatements,
extensions, or additions to the Restatement Second balancing test. The
reasonableness test requires a court to evaluate three former Restatement
Second factors before issuing a production order. Factors (c), (d), and
(e) in the Restatement Second balancing test - the extent to which the
conduct would occur outside the U.S., the nationality of the persons, and
Where it is reasonable for both states to exercise jurisdiction, "a state should defer to the other state
if that state's interest is clearly greater." Id at § 403(3).
222 Id. at § 442(l)(c).
223 Id. at § 442(2)(a)-(c) (emphasis added).
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the expected compliance - must be considered during the initial comity
analysis under the reasonableness test.224 However, the Restatement
Third replaces the "expected compliance" factor with the lesser standard
of "likelihood of conflict. ' 225 The vital national interests of the states,
formerly considered by courts as the Restatement Second balancing test
factor (a), must now be considered in the reasonableness test, section
403(2)(g), and at the order issuance stage under part five of the order
test.
The hardship test of Restatement Second section 40(b) has only
been partially integrated into the Restatement Third tests. The hardship
imposed upon the party producing the records can be considered by the
court under the reasonableness test, but only as the "justified expecta-
tions" of the party, which is a lower standard than actual hardship.226
Hardship must again be judged in the "enforcement test" but can clearly
be ignored at a court's discretion.227
C. Comity and the Judiciary
Although the Restatement Second test has been influential, it does
not represent the exclusive source of U.S. law. United States courts con-
fronting the problems associated with bank secrecy and blocking laws
developed several lines of cases. Initially, the Supreme Court and Second
Circuit228 created two standards. After the adoption of the Restatement
Second, the circuits created various tests both based on and rejecting the
suggested standard. Finally, the Supreme Court implicitly recognized
the validity of the Restatement Third, although the circuits have yet to
adopt that standard or any other uniform standard.
1. Socidtd Internationale and Civil Discovery
The Supreme Court first addressed the problems associated with
conflicting national laws in Socidtd Internationale pour Participations In-
dustrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers (SocidtdInternationale).229 A Swiss
company sued the U.S. government to recover assets seized during
World War II under the Trading with the Enemy Act. The U.S. govern-
224 See id. at § 403(a), (b), (h).
225 See infra notes 268-69 and accompanying text; Administratia Asigurarilor, supra note 20, at
1281 (Romanian secrecy law "vigorously enforced, thus satisfying section 40(e)").
226 This was consistent with federal appeals court decisions. See O'Donnell, supra note 215, at
539-40. See also infra note 310 and accompanying text.
227 RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 14, at § 442(2)(c).
228 See infra notes 239-47 and accompanying text.
229 Soci6t6 Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S.
197 (1958) [hereinafter Sociktd Internationale].
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ment claimed that the company's connection with a German firm made it
an enemy under the act and sought discovery from an alleged co-conspir-
ator, a third party Swiss banking firm, in order to show control of the
plaintiff by the German concern. After the United States moved to com-
pel discovery, the Swiss government, of its own volition, "confiscated"
the records.2"' I.G. Chemie, the plaintiff Swiss company, refused to
comply with the discovery orders because doing so would constitute a
violation of Swiss economic espionage and bank secrecy laws and the
confiscation order. A district court master found that the plaintiff did
not control the records but had made a good faith effort to comply with
the discovery request. In spite of that finding, the district court dis-
missed the case for plaintiff's failure to comply with its discovery order.
The Supreme Court reinstated the suit. Justice Harlan's opinion
first accepted that foreign laws do not constitute a complete bar to a
discovery order in cases under the Trading with the Enemy Act; U.S.
courts have the power, according to the holding, to require foreign na-
tional plaintiffs in such cases "to make all such efforts to the maximum of
their ability" to comply with a court order.231 Three factors influenced
the court's reasoning. First, Congress had expressed its "deep concern"
in effectuating the policy of "reach[ing] enemy interests which masquer-
aded under.. .innocent fronts." '232 Second, failure to reach these records
would "undermine [this] congressional polic[y]" because the records
"might have vital influence upon this litigation. . . ."I" Finally, the
plaintiff Sturzenegger was "in the most advantageous position to plead
with its own sovereign for relaxation of penal laws .... 234
The Court then found that in light of I.G. Chemie's good faith ef-
forts to procure the documents and a lack of collusion between the Swiss
government and the plaintiff, dismissal was inappropriate as a sanction
for noncompliance.235 In conclusion, the opinion stated: "[I]t is hardly
debatable that fear of criminal prosecution constitutes a weighty excuse
for nonproduction, and this excuse is not weakened because the laws
230 "This 'confiscation' left possession of the records in Sturzenegger [the Swiss banking firm
holding the records] and amounted to an interdiction on Sturzenegger's transmission of the records
to third persons." Id. at 200-201.
231 Id at 205.
232 Id (citations omitted).
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 208-212. In dicta, the Court stated that if the company had conspired prior to the war
to use Swiss bank secrecy provisions to avoid the penalties of the Trading with the Enemy Act, such
"deliberate impediments" would weigh in favor of dismissal. In this case, however, the Special
Master had found no such evidence. Id at 208-209.
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preventing compliance are those of a foreign sovereign. '236 The decision
limited its holding to this "given case."' 237 Accordingly, only courts con-
fronting foreign civil discovery conflicts follow the Court's specific
analysis.238
2. Restatement Second in the Second Circuit: Citibank II
In 1968, the Second Circuit rejected the Citibank I line of cases and
adopted the Restatement Second as the analytical framework for foreign
bank secrecy cases.2 3 9 In United States v. First National City Bank (Ci-
tibank II),20 the court rejected Citibank's application to reverse the dis-
trict court's contempt order against the bank and its vice-president who
refused to order bank employees to comply with an antitrust grand jury
subpoena. Although Citibank complied with the portions of the sub-
poena requesting documents held in New York City, the bank refused to
produce the documents kept in Frankfurt, West Germany. Citibank
claimed that disclosure would subject it to civil penalties and possibly
236 Id. at 211.
237 "We do not say that this ruling would apply to every [similar case] .... The.. .use [of
discovery orders] depends upon the circumstances of a given ase... ." Id. at 205-206. See Ura-
nium Antitrust, supra note 19, at 1147.
This "case-by-case" analysis was not, however, inherent in the comity principle. See Soeidt1
Nationale, supra note 113, at 554-55 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
238 The first of these in a court of appeals was in Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d
338 (10th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977) [hereinafter Finesilver] and State of Ohio v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1977) [hereinafter Arthur Andersen]. In these
cases, Ohio sought the production of documents held in Switzerland by Arthur Andersen & Co.
(Andersen), an accounting firm, in litigation involving a loan by Ohio to King Resources Company
Ohio claimed it relied on reports by the accounting firm.
Finesilver rejected Andersen's objection to the district court's discovery order. The Tenth Cir-
cuit noted Sociitd Internationale's distinction between challenges to discovery orders and sanctions
for violating such orders. According to the decision, Sociitdlnternationale required future courts to
only consider foreign law conflicts in sanction proceedings and not order proceedings. After certio-
rari was denied and the District Court found Andersen in contempt, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the
case again in Arthur Andersen. The panel upheld the District Court's sanctions based on the ac-
countant's lack of good faith in complying with the original order. Arthur Andersen, supra, at 1373.
Uranium Antitrust, supra note 19, arose from the Uranium cartel controversy of the late 1970s.
The district court ordered a variety of parties to comply with its outstanding discovery requests. Id.
at 1156. The parties refused to comply based on five sets of laws: blocking laws in Canada, Austra-
lia, and South Africa enacted in response to the Uranium cartel litigation; the Ontario Business
Records Protection Act, supra note 50; and Swiss Penal Code § 273, supra note 51. The District
Court accepted the broad analytical framework of Socijti Internationale, flatly rejecting the use of a
balancing test, in finding U.S. interests superior and granting plaintiff's motions to compel. See
supra note 214.
239 International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435, 438 n.4 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) [hereinafter Krishna].




criminal sanctions.24 The district court found them in contempt for re-
fusing to comply with the subpoena. District Court Judge Pollack re-
jected the bank's argument finding that criminal sanctions were unlikely,
that Citibank had not acted in good faith, and that even in the event of a
civil suit in West Germany by a customer, the bank should have a valid
defense.2 42
The court of appeals affirmed. It specifically adopted the Restate-
ment Second's position that states are not precluded from exercising ju-
risdiction solely because of possible foreign state liability.243 Noting this,
the panel accepted Citibank's assertion that absence of criminal sanctions
does not mandate subpoena compliance as the government claimed; nev-
ertheless, the court rejected the bank's claim because it found that these
particular civil sanctions were legally insufficient to warrant non-
compliance. 2 4
Second, the court rejected the claim that a clash in national interests
excused compliance with the subpoena, facially accepting the five-step
Restatement Second balancing test.245 The court, however, limited its
analysis to the first two factors: vital national interests and hardship to
the bank.246  Finding the German law unimportant to that country's
overall national policy and the likelihood of civil penalties remote, the
court of appeals upheld the contempt order.247
241 Citibank's expert, Dr. Martin Domke, testified that the bank's disclosure would breach the
"'self evident' contractual obligation" between the bank and its customer, constituting a civil liabil-
ity. Moreover, the customer could obtain an ex parte restraining order from a German court. If
Citibank violated the order, it would be subject to criminal contempt sanctions. Id. at 898-899.
242 The government's expert testified that Citibank could claim compulsion as a defense in the
civil suit and that specific exculpatory language in the contract would allow the bank's actions. Iai
at 899-900 n.6.
243 Id. at 901 (citing RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 201, at § 39(1)).
244 Id. at 902. The court cited the revocation of a bank's foreign business license as a case where
civil penalties might be sufficient to warrant non-compliance. Id.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 902-905. See also Davis, supra note 39; Krishna, supra note 239; Garpeg, Ltd. v. United
States, 583 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) [hereinafter Garpeg]; BSI, supra note 79. But see Compa-
gnie Frangaise D'Assurance pour le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum, 105 F.R.D. 16
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) [hereinafter Compagnie Frangaise].
247 Citibank 11, supra note 240, at 902-905.
A later decision in the Second Circuit reaffirmed in dicta the RESTATEMENT SECOND test. In
Trade Development Bank v. Continental Insurance Co., 469 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1972) [hereinafter
Trade Development Bank], the court of appeals accepted that the district court was entitled to bal-
ance the factors in the REsTATEMENT SECOND but expressed that all of the section 40 factors should
be considered in light of the "relative unimportance" of the information sought. Id. at 41.
A recent Second Circuit holding also considered the test. In Davis, supra note 39, the defendant
claimed a consent directive was improperly compelled on the basis of international comity. The
panel did not analyze the hardship factor because the bank, which would actually suffer the harm,
had not raised the objection. Davis followed Citibank 11 by only further considering the remaining
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3. Restatement Second in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits: Field and
Nova Scotia II
The Fifth Circuit panel in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United
States v. Field (Field)24 adopted a version of the balancing test, eight
years after Citibank II, with an even more restricted emphasis than Ci-
tibank II. A Canadian citizen named Field, managing director of a Cay-
man Island bank, was served in the lobby of Miami International Airport
with a subpoena to testify, before a grand jury investigating tax law viola-
tions, about his activities on behalf of the bank and his clients. He re-
fused based on, among other claims, the interests of international comity.
The court of appeals distinguished Citibank II in three important
ways. The panel first elevated the "vital national interest" factor to
supreme importance in the Restatement Second test.249 Second, the
court expanded the scope of review under the "vital national interest"
balancing test to include speculation as to a foreign government's views
on the limits of its own powers. Specificalfy, Field accepted grand jury
tax investigations as "vital" to prosecutions in our system of jurispru-
dence and found that the Cayman law, if granted complete deference,
would "significantly restrict" that process.25° The court claimed an in-
ternational consensus existed on the issue of tax investigations, noting the
fact that the United Kingdom allowed broad discretion in tax investiga-
tions and that even secrecy haven Switzerland would allow some U.S.
inquiry into Swiss bank records in tax matters. 251 Against this anecdotal
evidence and without considering the United States' international minor-
ity position on grand jury investigations,25 2 the court balanced the fact
factor of the Second Circuit's two part test. Davis, supra note 39, at 1034-1035. The Second Circuit
found the consent directive was compelled properly in the interests of comity, "[a]fter carefully
analyzing the competing national interests .. " Id. at 1035.
248 Field, supra note 6.
249 Id. at 407. Of the other four balancing factors not considered in the decision, the hardship
test plainly would have favored Field. The court did not address this possibility.
250 Id at 407-08.
251 The decision cites Note, Judicial Assistance - Criminal Procedure - Treaty with Switzerland
Affects Banking Secrecy Law - Provisions Against Organized Crime Set New Precedent - Treaty Be-
tween the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matter, Done at Bern, May 25, 1973, 15 HARV. INT'L L.J. 349, 359 (1974) for the proposition that
the Swiss will in some cases provide assistance to U.S. inquiries. The Note discussed the Swiss
MLAT, supra note 127, and commented that in organized crime investigations with ancillary tax
investigations, assistance would be allowed. The Note stated specifically and contrary to Field that,
"[u]nder Swiss law... tax evasion [is] not considered [a] criminal act .... Therefore, Swiss courts
[give] no assistance to foreign authorities in such cases." Id.
252 The court of appeals elevated the United States' interest in grand jury investigations above a
foreign sovereign's interests in preserving a right to financial privacy, contrary to prior appeals court
analysis. In a previous grand jury subpoena case, the Second Circuit stated, "[t]he Government ...
has a real interest in civil and criminal cases in obtaining evidence wherever located. However, we
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that in a Cayman government investigation, the local officials could order
the revelation of otherwise protected information.2 53 The court con-
cluded that these factors weighed against the national interests of the
Cayman government and in favor of the vital interests of the United
States.254 Implicitly, the court assumed that in light of the conflicting
national policies regarding bank secrecy, one government's right to
pierce bank secrecy allowed another foreign court to do the same, regard-
less of possibly differing national policies for allowing records
inspection.255
In a third distinction from Citibank II, the court rejected the valid-
ity of the Cayman economic interest in preserving bank secrecy. Field
claimed that the U.S. interest was reduced because it only involved "eco-
nomic regulation." The court rejected this claim, balancing Cayman in-
terests in creating a secrecy haven against U.S. interests in pursuing tax
violations and found that U.S. interests were dominant.256
While the Eleventh Circuit initially followed the truncated analysis
of Field in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova
Scotia (Nova Scotia 1),257 the circuit revived the full balancing test in In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia (Nova
Scotia 11).258 Against a complex factual background, the Bank of Nova
Scotia essentially responded to a grand jury subpoena in a piecemeal
manner. The government served the subpoena on the bank's Miami
branch for documents in the Bahamas and Cayman Islands in a narcotics
investigation. Due to the bank's delayed production, the district court
fined the bank $1,825,000. The panel examined the Bank of Nova Sco-
tia's claim that the U.S. court's exercise of its enforcement powers should
have been moderated in the interests of comity, considering the conflict-
ing obligations imposed on the bank.259 In its Restatement Second anal-
also have an obligation to respect the laws of other sovereign states even though they may differ in
economic and legal philosophy from our own." Chase, supra note 210, at 613.
253 Field, supra note 6, at 408.
254 Id. at 410.
255 "[Would not the federal courts be sorely offended if a foreign nation were to compel disclo-
sure of grand jury proceedings in violation of a rule of court, not even a statute of the nation, because
that rule itself permitted disclosure to appropriate authorities in the United States?" O'Donnell,
supra note 215, at 539, citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
256 Field, supra note 6, at 408-409. The court also injected the political views of the Congress
into its balancing analysis. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
257 Nova Scotia I, supra note 10. Judge Lewis Morgan, who wrote Nova Scotia I, also wrote Field.
The decision implicitly reaffirmed the explicit refusal to consider the possible hardship on third party
subpoena targets in Citibank II, supra note 240, at 904-05.
258 Nova Scotia I, supra note 10. Field remains, however, valid law in the Fifth Circuit.
259 Id. at 826-27.
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ysis, the court reinvigorated the four balancing test factors rejected in
Field.260
4. Restatement Second in the Ninth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits:
Vetco, First Chicago, and Aerospatiale/Rubin
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Vetco (Vetco)2 61 first applied
the balancing test to bank secrecy cases,2 62 and while it did not truncate
the test as the Fifth Circuit had, Vetco extended some of the questionable
conclusions of Field. The IRS believed that Vetco, Inc. used two foreign
corporations to funnel goods to its Swiss subsidiary in order to avoid
reporting requirements. The agency summonsed Vetco, Inc. and its ac-
countants to determine whether the company had attempted to circum-
vent reporting requirements. When both parties refused to comply with
the summonses and the subsequent district court order, the court im-
posed contempt sanctions. The accountants and Vetco appealed the or-
der and sanctions.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed using a more detailed balancing frame-
work than the Fifth and Second Circuits in Field and Citibank II, respec-
tively. Based on a Swiss government representative's statement, the
court found, in balancing the competing vital national interests of the
United States and Switzerland, that the balance tipped in favor of the
United States.2 63 In analyzing the competing hardships under section
40(b), the court minimized the danger the Swiss criminal law represented
to Vetco because duress "may be a defense" to a criminal proceeding
under Swiss law and no cases existed in Switzerland where an IRS sum-
260 Nova Scotia H emphasized the vital national interest of U.S. narcotics investigations and the
diminished privacy interests of the United States in foreign bank accounts against the Cayman gov-
ernment's stated policy of not supporting money laundering. Id. at 827-28. (In discussing the re-
duced privacy interests of Americans offshore, the panel cited Payner, supra note 94: "[Tlhere is
nothing in the [Cayman Bank Secrecy Statute] to suggest that it is the public policy of the Cayman
Islands to permit a person to launder the proceeds of crime in the Cayman Islands, secure from
detection and punishment." Id. at 828, quoting In re Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law,
United States v. Carver (Jamaica Ct. App. 1982) (Joint Brief of the United Kingdom and the Cay-
man Islands, Appendix L). Rejecting the three renewed Restatement factors as persuasive, the court
dismissed the bank's comity claim. Id. at 829.
Nova Scotia IFs analysis only discussed the Cayman statute instead of the Bahamian laws be-
cause the bank and amicus briefs of the Canadian Bankers Association and the government of the
Cayman Islands based most of their arguments on those laws. Nova Scotia II, supra note 10, at 826
n.14.
261 Vetco, supra note 10.
262 The Ninth Circuit adopted the section 40 balancing test originally as part of its effects doc-
trine analysis in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976)
[hereinafter Tiberlane].
263 Vetco, supra note 10, at 1331.
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mons resulted in prosecution. 64 The court of appeals summarily found
the remaining Restatement factors unpersuasive. 65
The significance of Vetco, aside from its recognition of all five Re-
statement Second factors, stems from the court's consideration of the im-
portance of the documents and possible alternate means of compliance in
addition to the Restatement test. The court found the value of the docu-
ments to the IRS to be persuasive.2 66 As to possible alternate means, the
court rejected the allegedly equivalent means suggested by the
defendants.2 67
The Seventh Circuit also adopted the Restatement Second balancing
test in United States v. First National Bank of Chicago (First Chicago).
268
The IRS served First Chicago seeking disclosure of records held in the
bank's branch in Athens, Greece. Greek law prohibited any disclosure of
bank records.2 69 On First Chicago's appeal of the district court compli-
ance order, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for further
consideration.
The court in First Chicago analyzed the conflict in light of all five
balancing test factors, placing special emphasis on the hardship to be
264 Id. at 1331-32 (emphasis added). The court stated that because the corporation was supposed
to keep sufficient records on hand to allow the IRS to make this particular compliance determina-
tion, the hardship was diminished; this simply begged the question, however, as to whether disclo-
sure would still cause actual hardship upon the corporation. Id. at 1332.
265 Id.
266 The court cited Westinghouse, supra note 19, where the documents were not essential to the
litigation, and the dicta reference in Trade Development Bank, supra note 247, to the importance of
the documents. Vetco, supra note 10, at 1333. This 'document importance' position was rejected by
the Eleventh Circuit in Nova Scotia I, supra note 10, at 1389-91.
267 The defendants suggested consents, letters rogatory, treaties, masking third party names, the
use of a Swiss law expert, and IRS examination in Switzerland. Vetco, supra note 10, at 1332.
268 First Chicago, supra note 7.
269 The Greek law stated:
Article 1: Deposits in Greek banks are regarded as secret.
Article 2:
I. Governors, members of the board, [members of] other collective bodies, or employees
of a bank who, in the course of their duties acquire knowledge of deposits, convey any informa-
tion in any manner, are punished with a minimum of 6 months' imprisonment.
The consent or approval of the depositor who has the right of secrecy does not change the
punishable nature of the act.
2. Upon conviction for the [above] offense .... the court cannot order suspension of the
penalty nor can it change a conviction to a fine.
3. The persons mentioned in Section 1, called upon as witnesses at civil or criminal trial,
cannot be questioned on the secret deposits, even though the depositor consents.
Article 3: As an exception, information is allowed on secret bank deposits only by virtue of a
specially justified decision of a domestic court, to the extent that the information is regarded as
absolutely necessary for searching and punishing offenses which are regarded as felonies com-
mitted in Greece.
GREEK BANK SECRECY AcT, reprinted in First Chicago, supra note 7, at 344 n.2 (emphasis added)
[hereinafter GREEK LAW].
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placed on the actor under section 40(b).270 This factor, according to the
court of appeals, weighed heavily in favor of the bank because of the
great hardship that would be imposed on bank employees. In light of the
other balancing test factors, which also weighed in favor of the bank, the
Seventh Circuit found the interests of comity favored Greece and First
Chicago. The court remanded for the district court to determine if the
bank should be ordered to make a good faith effort to obtain the
records. 27 1
The Eighth Circuit summarily adopted the Restatement Second bal-
ancing test in In re Sociitd Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale (Aerospa-
tiale)272 with little comment. A later case reaffirmed the test in dicta and
made some additional observations. In United States v. Rubin,273 the
court rejected the defendant's appeal concerning a quashed subpoena.
Rubin had served a subpoena at trial on a Cayman Island bank officer
who was testifying for the government. The defendant hoped to force the
officer to produce documents about accounts controlled by two Cayman
citizens not party to the litigation.2 74 The decision turned on the court's
assessment of the actual probative value of this information but in dicta
applied the Restatement Second balancing test. The court found that the
Cayman nationality and third party status of the account holders
strengthened the Cayman interest in preserving secrecy; moreover, cases
cited by Rubin favoring compulsion involved secret grand jury proceed-
ings, not a public criminal defense.275
5. Hybrid Cases: Westinghouse Electric and In re Sealed Case
There are two circuit court cases which combine different forms of
analysis to reach a conclusion. First, the Tenth Circuit decided In re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig. (Westinghouse),2 76 a
case arising from the uranium cartel controversy. Westinghouse sought
270 "In determining whether to refrain from exercising jurisdiction, a state must give special
weight to the nature of the penalty that may be imposed by the other state." Id. at 345-46 (citations
omitted).
271 First Chicago specifically addressed the differing conclusion reached in Nova Scotia . The
court distinguished the earlier case on four grounds: 1) The Bank of Nova Scotia had not made a
good faith effort to comply; 2) Nova Scotia I involved a grand jury investigation of tax and narcotics
law violations; 3) the Greek law treated disclosures with consent as a crime; and 4) Bahamian courts
appeared to not be as strictly limited. First Chicago, supra note 7, at 346-347.
272 In re Soci&6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120, 126-27 (8th Cir. 1986) [here-
inafter Aerospatiale], vacated on other grounds, SocidtJ Nationale, supra note 113.
273 United States v. Rubin, 836 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Rubin].
274 Ird. at 1102.
275 Id. (citing Field, supra note 6, Nova Scotia II, supra note 10, Davis, supra note 39, and Vetco,
supra note 10).
276 Westinghouse, supra note 19.
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to compel discovery by Rio Algom, a Canadian company doing business
in Utah, and its president. 7 Previously, Westinghouse caused letters
rogatory to be issued to the Supreme Court of Ontario, which declined to
enforce them based on a conflict with the stated national policy of the
Canadian government.27 8 After finding Rio Algom in contempt for fail-
ing to comply with the district court discovery order, the Canadian con-
cern appealed.
Integrating the Socidtd Internationale and balancing test analyses,
the Tenth Circuit overturned the contempt order and sanctions. The
panel held that "Socidtd [Internationale] calls for a 'balancing approach'
on a case-by-case basis" and that "[g]uidance as to [those] factors ... is
[to be] found" in the Restatement Second.2 7 9 After determining that Rio
Algom made a good faith effort to comply with the discovery order as
required under Socidtd Internationale,28° the court weighed the facts
under the balancing test. Concentrating heavily on the "national inter-
est" factor, the panel noted the clear Canadian interest in "controlling
and supervising [its] atomic energy [industry]" and that the nondisclo-
sure regulations furthered that goal.28 1 By comparison, the U.S. interest
of ensuring adequate discovery by litigants in U.S. courts was diminished
by the partially cumulative nature of the discovery and the fact that the
order did not encompass government law enforcement goals nor a grand
jury investigation.282 Given the disparity of these interests and in light of
the other balancing test factors, the court vacated the district court's
holding.
In the second hybrid case, In re Sealed Case,283 the U.S. Attorney
had served a bank in the United States, owned by country X, with a
grand jury subpoena for documents at the bank's branch in country Y.
The bank refused to produce the documents based on the bank secrecy
laws of Y and the district court found it in contempt when it failed to
produce the documents after a good faith effort.284 The bank claimed
277 Id. at 994.
278 Id. at 995 (citing Duquesne Light, supra note 112). The Ontario court held that compliance
would contradict the policy behind the Atomic Energy Control Act and violate the Uranium Infor-
mation Security Regulations (UISR) (reprinted in Duquesne Light, supra note 112, at 293), promul-
gated thereunder. The UISR had a maximum fine of $10,000, or five years imprisonment, or both.
Westinghouse, supra note 19, at 996.
279 Id. at 997.
280 Five months later in Arthur Andersen, the Tenth Circuit found this factor to be the initial test
before reaching the balancing analysis; the later court distinguished Andersen from Rio Algom
based on the former's lack of good faith. Arthur Andersen, supra note 238, at 1373.
281 Westinghouse, supra note 19, at 998.
282 Id. at 999.
283 Sealed Case, supra note 6.
284 Id. at 495-98.
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that the court erred in entering a contempt order because of the conflict-
ing demands of the United States and country Y. The D.C. Circuit
agreed. Although the holding did not explicitly accept the Restatement
analysis, it considered a number of decisions that used the balancing
test.285 The panel concentrated on the fact that a contempt order re-
quired conflicting conduct. In light of this conflict, the bank's status as a
third party in the investigation, its ownership by country X, and the clear
jurisdiction of country Y over the conduct of the bank weighed against
enforcement.286
6. Restatement Third
Some cases analyzed or noted tentative drafts of the Restatement
Third prior to its actual publication. 8 The most serious discussion
came from the Supreme Court in Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Aerospa-
tiale v. United States District Court (Sociftj Nationale),2 88 the appeal of
the Aerospatiale decision. While the holding centered on whether the use
of the Hague Evidence Convention was mandatory, the rationale of the
majority and the opinion of the dissenters are instructive. The Court
recommended in a footnote that the factors in the Restatement Third
order test should "guide a comity analysis" '289 by the district court, but
nonetheless maintained the "case-by-case" comity analysis.29 0 "The ex-
act line between reasonableness and unreasonableness in each case must
be drawn by the trial court, based on its knowledge of the case and of the
claims and interests of the parties and the governments whose statutes
and policies they invoke." '29 1 The majority also stated that courts should
place special emphasis on protecting foreign litigants from excessive dis-
covery burdens.2 92 The four person dissent agreed that such a comity
analysis was appropriate for cases where treaties had not been negoti-
ated,293 but believed that the Hague Evidence Convention's general ap-
plication should be presumed.
285 These included the pre-RESTATEMENT SECOND cases, supra notes 202-10 and accompanying
text; Westinghouse, supra note 19; and Vetco, supra note 10.
286 Sealed Case also distinguished Nova Scotia I, supra note 10, and Nova Scotia HI, supra note 10,
by noting that the former case involved a U.S. subsidiary which might not be subject to the bank
secrecy laws and that both cases involved a lack of good faith. Sealed Case, supra note 6, at 498.
287 See Davis, supra note 39, at 1027 n.4; First Chicago, supra note 7, at 346; Garpeg, supra note
246, at 796; Graco, supra note 217, at 516.
288 Sociditd Nationale, supra note 113.
289 Id. at 544 n.28.
290 Id. at 548 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
291 Id. at 546. 0
292 Id.
293 Id. at 556 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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A pair of cases tangentially considered the implications of the Re-
statement Third after its publication. The court in In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, Yanagihara Grand Jury2 94  noted, "[t]he revisions
[encompassed in section 403] are immaterial to the issue before the court,
and thus do not alter the comity analysis." The Seventh Circuit, in Rein-
surance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat (Administration
of State Insurance),2 95 became the first court of appeals to consider the
published Restatement Third tests. The panel stated that the Restate-
ment Third section 442 test and the Restatement Second section 40 test
were similar, and that "[a]lthough there are certain differences in empha-
sis, the factors to be considered remain largely synonymous and do not
alter our determination....
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
The U.S. executive branch actively pursued various multilateral and
bilateral agreements throughout the 1980s, while the judicial branch lim-
ited the rights of accused individuals and third party subpoena targets
during the same period. These executive and judicial trends limit the
total number of future situations that will result in international disputes,
but they also magnify the severity of any future conflict.
A. The Executive Branch
To better obtain foreign documents, testimony, and records, the
United States negotiated a number of treaties to avoid the impractical use
of letters rogatory in obtaining records. These compacts are not, how-
ever, a panacea. First, agreements do not extend to every important ju-
risdiction. Only ten MLATs have entered into force. The Narcotics
Treaty may gain wide acceptance in the future, but only a handful of
nations have signed it. Securities and antitrust understandings exist with
only a handful of major industrial nations and tax treaties, although nu-
merous, still do not cover every haven.
Second, even if treaties had wider acceptance, some nations would
inevitably maintain bank secrecy or blocking laws for particular eco-
nomic or policy reasons. Under today's international agreements, some
nations simply refuse to assist the United States in certain areas of law
enforcement,297 and even if those nations changed their policies, other
294 Yanagihara, supra note 102.
295 Administratia Asigurarilor, supra note 20.
296 Id. at 1282 (citing Yanagihara, supra note 102, at 196 n.6).
297 See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
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countries would take their place.298
Finally, assuming the best case scenario for the United States in
which every nation entered some sort of cooperative treaty, conflicts
would still arise because of different views as to what constitutes criminal
and inappropriate civil behavior. For example, the U.S. policy on insider
trading does not require violation of a professional duty for liability,
whereas Swiss, European Community, and Cayman policies demand a
violation of a duty.299 Furthermore, the expansive effects doctrine basis
of jurisdiction employed by the United States dwarfs the more reserved
European Court of Justice or German versions, among those few indus-
trialized nations that accept this new jurisdictional base.3"0 The differ-
ing views on this doctrine will affect the future application of, for
example, any extraterritorial antitrust action.
The President should continue to aggressively pursue such treaties
and agreements, which represent the best method of fostering comity.
30 1
In other areas, however, the actions of the executive are promoting U.S.
force over international cooperation. In the evolution of U.S. case law,
the President has been more than a willing participant. Most cases that
aggressively extend the enforcement of subpoenas came about at the initi-
ative of the Justice Department. 0 2 In future cases, the Justice Depart-
ment should at least maintain a deferential view towards agreements
negotiated by the President and independent agencies such as the SEC,
and not attempt to circumvent them when treaty partners fail to cede to
Justice Department requests that fall outside treaty provisions.
B. The Legislative Branch
Congress also bears some fault in the present conflict. As law writer
and treaty reviewer, the legislative branch can create or destroy support
298 See supra note 8.
299 See supra note 144. Melloan, supra note 148. The European Community's Insider Trading
Directive requires EC nations to enact laws prohibiting trading based on information acquired "in
the exercise of a person's profession or dut[y]." Council Directive Coordinating Regulation on Insider
Trading art. 1, § 1, 132 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 277) 13 (1989), 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
Section 95,028. See Warren, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Achievements of the Eu-
ropean Communities, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 185, 217-19 (1990). Even among the Europeans, some
nations greet the prospect of enforcing insider trading laws with "nods and winks." Id. at 231.
300 The Justice Department "applies the 'direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable' stan-
dard" when deciding whether to pursue an alleged international antitrust violation. DOJ Int'l AT
Guidelines, supra note 11, at S-21. See Timberlane, supra note 262; Manington Mills v. Congoleum
Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Bayer/Firestone, Kammergericht, Nov. 26, 1980, W v
W/E OLG 2441 (Synthetischer Kautschuk I, 1980).
301 Ellinger, Extraterritorial Aspects of Bank Secrecy, J. Bus. L. 439, 446 (1985).
302 See Citibank II, supra note 240; Field, supra note 6; Vetco, supra note 10; Nova Scotia 1, supra
note 10; and Nova Scotia II, supra note 10.
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for actions by the Justice Department. One proposed policy is clearly
unwise: Congress should not pressure the President to force other na-
tions to change their secrecy laws through the use of sanctions.30 3 This
policy is at best arrogant and at worst anti-democratic. The United
States should not assume that it has established the perfect free market
order. Other democratically elected governments have chosen to respect
the privacy of individuals' financial affairs.304 As one business publica-
tion remarked:
Just because almost all other countries have given up what for centuries had
been a globally upheld financial freedom, the Swiss are not believed to have
the slightest inclination to follow suit .... [W]hy should the Swiss banking
system give up the very discretion for which it is world-renowned and
respected?
30 5
The U.S. government hopes to solve many of its law enforcement
problems by attacking an old financial tradition preserved by foreign sov-
ereigns. The United States should concentrate on solving its own
problems instead of harassing other nations that do not share the U.S.
passion for prosecuting crimes on which nations disagree.30 6
Aside from these philosophical considerations, the proposed con-
gressional policy would be ineffective. The dollar is the universal cur-
rency. Any sanctions imposed by the United States could be easily
circumvented by foreign banks.307 The United States probably lacks the
political will to impose sanctions on those other nations and, even if the
government tried to impose such sanctions, the protectionist policy
would savage the U.S. financial services industry.308
The Senate can reduce international friction by quickly acting on
treaties submitted by the President. The Senate's delay in approving the
last six MLATs was irresponsible. For Congress to propose sanctions
303 This has been recommended by a Congressional Committee, which proposed that sanctions
include denial of access to the U.S. dollar clearing system and revocation of U.S. branch charters.
BANKS AND FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 12, at 32.
304 See supra notes 7-8, 20 and accompanying text.
305 Assault on Privacy: US. Officials Ought to Stop Maligning Swiss Banks, BARRON'S, Jan. 20,
1989, at 1.
306 This particular passion is most offensive in tax prosecutions. Although one official described
it as a question of "being serious" about collecting taxes, supra note 10, a more appropriate question
is whether the United States is more concerned about solving its own law enforcement problems on
its own soil than pushing its problems onto other sovereign nations in an area where no international
consensus exists and, in respect to criminal prosecutions, the United States is in the clear minority.
R. JOHNS, supra note 8, at 43-44. See also supra notes 12 and 151.
307 See supra note 303. These could be circumvented by clearing dollars through banks in others
nations and a handful of major international banks remaining chartered in those nations.
308 The results of such sanctions would be similar in effect, though not in scope, to the forced
domestic divestment of non-investment grade debt securities by U.S. banks, which helped bankrupt
Drexel Burham and depress Wall Street.
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while agreements with other nations languish in the Senate clearly does
not serve the interests of justice or comity.
C. The Judicial Branch
The primary cause of the international conflict is the courts. There
appears to be little chance that the Constitution will reduce the friction.
The Supreme Court made consent forms a clearly legal method of pro-
curing individuals' records held in bank secrecy jurisdictions. Whether
these compelled consents will be accepted in nations holding the records
remains unclear,30 9 but litigants can no longer prevent such production
on constitutional grounds.310 The more important questions for future
courts will concern third party subpoenas. Several important problems
exist with U.S. judicial doctrine on this subject.
In third party cases, where consents do not apply, courts have re-
jected secrecy laws because they prejudice U.S. interests without consid-
ering the valid interests of economies dependant on private banking and
nations that protect their interests with blocking laws.311 This judicial
policy will only exacerbate the friction between nations. Many banking
nations tie their economic livelihood to bank secrecy, but U.S. tribunals
continue to ignore this interest.312 Other courts have rejected blocking
laws because their stated intent is only to block U.S. investigations and
frustrate U.S. interests.313 Yet the courts fail to explain why important
U.S. judicial procedure interests must necessarily override the interests of
other nations in upholding their laws and protecting their citizens and
corporations.314
United States courts commonly respond to this dilemma by repeat-
ing an oft quoted statement from Citibank I: "If [the corporation] can-
not, as it were, serve two masters and comply with the lawful
requirements both of the United States and [the foreign nation], perhaps
it should surrender to one sovereign or the other the privileges received
309 See supra note 107.
310 See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
311 See supra note 255 and accompanying text. "There is... a tendency on the part of courts,
perhaps unrecognized, to view a dispute from a local perspective." Soci Nationale, supra note
113, at 553 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
312 See supra note 259. See also Garpeg, supra note 246, at 794-796.
313 See Aerospatiale, supra note 272, at 127; Compagnie Franqaise, supra note 246, at 30.
314 See supra note 254. The attitude of the courts and their draconian responses are especially
offensive when one considers that the underlying values supporting these laws is, for the United
States, administrative preference, and for the havens, fundamental economic organization. Given
the sanctions U.S. courts are willing to impose, a casual observer could mistake U.S. laws as having
some undefined moral foundation.
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therefrom." '315 The Tenth Circuit properly rejected this rationale in
Westinghouse Electric:
The argument that because [the subsidiary, Rio Algom, is doing business in
Utah and enjoying the privileges afforded by the United States], Rio Algom
is somehow ungrateful when it fails to obey the discovery orders of the local
courts and that it is only proper that it be compelled to comply therewith is
superficially appealing. However, this is but one side of the argument. The
fact still remains that.., the business records which Westinghouse seeks to
examine are physically located in Canada [which] has a legitimate interest
in the disclosure of these documents ....316
The problem, as implicitly recognized by the Tenth Circuit, is that third
parties and unwilling individuals are caught between competing national
interests. The solution lies in deference to comity, not a resort to
compulsion.
The Supreme Court should adopt the Restatement Third's reasona-
bleness and order tests317 to replace the Socidt6 Internationale "case by
case" analysis for cases where foreign bank secrecy and blocking laws bar
production of documents. 318 As evidenced by the various circuit court
decisions on the matter, no consensus exists among the circuits as to
what test should be applied or how to apply each of the different tests.319
Adopting the Restatement Third analysis will not necessarily eliminate
international conflict but it will provide uniform guidance to courts con-
fronted by the comity dilemma.
Although the Restatement Third will provide an acceptable initial
framework, several modifications are required and important guidance in
the application should be added. First, in addition to the broad range
factors encompassed by the order test, courts must also recognize the
hardship imposed upon individuals, a concept enunciated in Restatement
Second section 40(b). 320  Hardship imposed upon the ordered party
315 Citibank I, supra note 202, at 620 (cited in Nova Scotia II, supra note 10, at 828; United States
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 584 F. Supp. 1080, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Garpeg, supra note 246, at 797;
BSI, supra note 79, at 115).
316 Westinghouse, supra note 19, at 999.
317 See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text. This would extend the test recommended by
the court in Socidtd Nationale to cases without treaties. See supra note 287.
318 The RESTATEMENT THIRD'S enforcement test, supra note 223 and accompanying text, is
merely a restatement of part of the holding in Societdlnternationale. See supra note 237 and accom-
panying text. The financial and practical hardships associated with extraterritorial discovery should
also be considered by courts. See Socidtd Nationale, supra note 113, at 546. Hardship, as discussed
herein, generally refers to foreign penalties for violating foreign laws.
319 The Supreme Court used a "case-by-case" analysis in Socidt6Nationale but the guidance pro-
vided by the Court in footnote 28, supra note 287 and accompanying text, should limit the unfettered
discretion of trial courts. Prescott & Alley, supra note 124, at 942. But see id. at 942 n. 13.
320 The hardship imposed upon litigants was of prime concern in the recommended analysis in
Socidtd Nationale. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
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should be maintained as an additional and specific consideration in the
order test. Relegating this concept to the reasonableness or enforcement
tests is inappropriate: first, it necessarily assumes that subpoenaed par-
ties could conceivably hold "justified expectations" about foreign laws
which are accepted by some U.S. courts and rejected by others; and sec-
ond, the enforcement test considerations are merely suggested, not
mandatory. With the exception of select circuits judging a small group
of bank secrecy and blocking laws, the idea of justified expectations based
on precedent remains nonsensical.
In analyzing the potential hardship, balancing the varying degrees of
penalties should be considered by courts. Making document production
a game to determine which nation can squeeze an individual or corpora-
tion hardest with sanctions, penalties, or imprisonment does not advance
the overall interests of justice. Courts have in the past doubted the effi-
cacy of foreign penalties,321 but in the future, U.S. tribunals should not
discount the effect of other penalties unless the actual difference is
clear.322 Similarly, the willingness of U.S. courts to impose heavy penal-
ties323 on individuals and corporations should indicate that nations are
willing to exact extensive penalties in pursuit of their national interests.
While U.S. policies might indeed outweigh foreign interests, the degree of
the foreign penalty, be it capital, criminal, or civil, must be recognized
and balanced in good faith against the domestic interests involved.324
Finally, courts should not downplay the potential hardship imposed
by a foreign statute simply because the law has never been used before
325
or because the discovery target is not required to return to the secrecy
haven.326 First, even if the intent of a secrecy or blocking law were that
it never actually be used, foreign criminal laws should not be given a
"one bite" rule. A U.S. ruling that brought about the first "bite" would
be no more just simply because the U.S. court believed the foreign law
would not be used. Second, the fact that the hardship will be imposed on
a non-national of the secrecy haven does not reduce the hardship im-
posed on that individual. Significant personal, property, and business
321 See infra note 323.
322 See, eg., Citibank 11, supra note 240, at 902 (civil penalties in other cases could be sufficiently
severe to equal criminal penalties). The Panamanian law's penalty in Chase, supra note 210, at 613,
effectively made it a misdemeanor.
323 Supra note 26.
324 See supra note 3 and accompanying text; RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 201, at § 40(b).
325 See Vetco, supra note 10, at 1332 ("No case has been cited in which a person has been prose-
cuted for complying with a court order enforcing an IRS summons."); Compagnie Frangaise, supra
note 246, at 30-31; Graco, supra note 217, at 514.
326 Sealed Case, supra note 6.
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connections to a secrecy haven3 27 should be taken into account in any
hardship analysis.
Aside from the revived hardship analysis, the Supreme Court should
adopt "better faith" revival of the national interest balancing factor in
the Restatement Third order test. While more general international
agreement might exist as to traditional criminal laws, little agreement
exists as to economic laws and economic crimes. Bank secrecy laws are
generally maintained because of their positive fiscal effects while blocking
laws arise from conflicts in economic and procedural priorities. These
foreign laws should not be summarily rejected as invalid national inter-
ests simply because their purpose is in opposition to U.S. interests. Laws
that protect individuals from the threat of extraterritorial application of
U.S. economic laws involve no less valid interests than the United States
has in advancing its own economic interests.328 Similarly, promoting
economic growth by better preserving the right to financial privacy also
merits more consideration than previously given when compared to U.S.
interests. One need only look to U.S. frustration with foreign blocking
laws that obstruct U.S. antitrust investigations to discover how the
United States would react to the frustration of its own economic inter-
ests. Courts must honestly and in "better faith" respect those interests
when balancing competing national interests.
In addition, courts should not accept the ability of a foreign sover-
eign or court to pierce bank secrecy as lessening that nation's interest in
that secrecy.329 As evidenced by the existence of blocking laws and the
conflicts in the cases discussed above, nations prioritize their economic
and social policies differently. The fact that a foreign law allows the for-
eign government to pierce bank secrecy does not mean that its rationale
for doing so necessarily coincides with U.S. policies. One commentator
questioned whether U.S. courts would react so cavalierly if a foreign na-
327 Id. at 495.
328 This position does not represent a retreat to the often shallow defense of "cultural relativism."
Conflicts in this area still exist among nations that have accepted capitalism and respect individual
rights. The difficulty here is not in the choice of economic or social systems but the creation of rules
for those systems; it is a difficulty that has arisen to the partial fault of the United States, which
wants to significantly and unilaterally change the previously accepted rules with which it agreed
until recently. See supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
329 See Field, supra note 6, at 408; Garpeg, supra note 246, at 796; BSI, supra note 79, at 118. Cf
First Chicago, supra note 7. In First Chicago, the Greek law provided a very limited exception for
furnishing certain information. That exception, however, did not allow account holder waiver and
only allowed Greek courts to make exceptions where production was "absolutely necessary for
searching and punishing" crimes regarded as felonies in Greece. GREEK LAW, supra note 269, at
art. 3; Administratia Asigurarilor, supra note 20, at 1282-83 ("There are no exceptions to Romania's
secrecy law.").
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tion sought to circumvent U.S. grand jury secrecy.330 Similarly, would
U.S. courts accept the claim of a foreign nation that the attorney-client
privilege could be violated simply because the foreign nation desired such
information and U.S. rules allow the breach in certain situations? Proba-
bly not. The appropriate solution dictates that domestic courts not rely
on the ability of foreign governments and courts to pierce secrecy or al-
low production of documents in order to justify the U.S. court's decision
to force a violation of the foreign law.
Finally, courts should consider executive action between govern-
ments as expressing national interests. Where treaties exist between na-
tions and a dispute arises because of practices specifically excluded or
differentiated in the agreement's obligations, courts should defer to those
concrete displays of national interests.331 Such deference would promote
the traditional concept of international comity and would reduce friction
between nations that have stated their official level of consensus on a
particular issue. Courts should not, however, take foreign government
indifference to particular subpoena targets as an indication of a lessened
foreign government interest in the matter.332 Every litigant should not
be required to obtain the express and affirmative support of the govern-
ment of a secrecy or blocking jurisdiction simply to provide additional
support to a policy clearly expressed by the text of banking and blocking
laws.
These analytical considerations do not guarantee impartial applica-
tion of any balancing test chosen by a court, nor that international dis-
putes will not arise because U.S. courts order foreign document
production. But the continued progress made with bilateral and multi-
lateral agreements, along with good faith judicial consideration of a uni-
form standard adopted by the Supreme Court, will help reduce
international friction.
VII. CONCLUSION
Bank secrecy evolved over the past century to meet the needs of
330 See supra note 255.
331 See Sociitd Nationale, supra note 113, at 552 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Unlike the courts,
'diplomatic and executive channels are, by definition, designed to exchange, negotiate, and reconcile
the problems which accompany the realization of national interests within the sphere of interna-
tional association,'" quoting Laker Airways, supra note 214, at 955). Cf. Socidtd Nationale, supra
(majority opinion) (although the use of the Hague Evidence Convention is not required, it represents
one alternative for discovery; the Convention's use can be considered and courts should weigh the
various interests in deference to this agreement negotiated by the U.S. government).




individuals avoiding government criminal and fiscal practices. The
United States, like many other nations, has prioritized its enforcement
goals and seen a corresponding growth in both financial privacy jurisdic-
tions catering to U.S. citizens as well as blocking statutes in industrial-
ized nations. Diplomatic efforts will reduce the conflict but the disparate
and often prejudicial tests of the circuit courts will promote friction
where agreement does not exist. The Supreme Court must adopt a uni-
form test to be applied in a more even-handed manner than in the past.
The President must pursue international cooperation instead of attempt-
ing to coerce other nations into changing their financial privacy laws.
Only then will the U.S. judiciary meet Judge Moore's call to respect the
principals of international comity and friendly relations among states.
